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INTRODUCTION
1

“Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Hardly a typical Memorial Day
tribute, protesters chanted and carried signs displaying this and other
2
offensive statements near the Arlington National Cemetery entrance.
Standing in a closed-off area across a four-lane road, a few members
of the Westboro Baptist Church—unaffiliated with any mainstream
3
Baptist church—presented incredibly deplorable views.
They
designed their demonstration to incite action, namely to reverse the
4
United States’ tolerance of homosexuality. Although they succeeded
in spurring action, Congress’s response worked against the
protesters’ cause. That day, as the small group picketed and crowds
of people came to remember fallen service members, President Bush
signed into law the Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act
1. Associated Press, Anti-gay group protests at National Cemetery: Church group stages
Memorial Day demonstration, prompting opposition, MSNBC, May 29, 2006, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/10663255/.
2. See id. (listing other slogans written on the signs, including “God is America’s
terror,” “You’re going to hell,” and “Bush killed them,” and stating that the
protesters also sang “God hates America” to the tune of “God Bless America”).
3. See id. (noting that, because a line of police cars and noisy traffic across a
four-lane highway separated protesters and military supporters, the two groups could
not hear each other, but held signs to express their views); Brian Goodman, Funeral
Picketers Sued by Marine’s Dad, CBSNEWS.COM, July 28, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com
/stories/2006/07/27/national/main1843396.shtml (stating that the Phelps family
founded the Westboro Baptist Church in 1955, but that the Church has no affiliation
with mainstream Baptist churches despite its name).
4. See Goodman, supra note 3, (“Our job . . . is to put this cup of his wrath and
fury to the lips of this nation and make them drink it.” (quoting Shirley PhelpsRoper, spokeswoman, Westboro Baptist Church)); see also Ann Rostow, Marine’s
parents sue anti-gay Phelps clan, PLANETOUT NEWS, June 5, 2006, http://www.
planetout.com/news/article.html?2006/06/05/5 (explaining that the Westboro
Baptist Church’s leader, Rev. Fred Phelps, protests funerals because he believes that
“God is punishing the United States for the country’s gay-friendly policies”).
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5

(“RAFHA” or “the Act”), essentially prohibiting demonstrations
within three hundred feet of any national cemetery, including
Arlington. Yet, even this could not discourage the Westboro Baptist
Church from speaking out. One month later, the group returned to
protest twenty-five year-old Army First Lieutenant Forrest Ewens’s
6
funeral. As grieving family and friends laid Lieutenant Ewens to rest,
those protesters discounted his sacrifice as punishment for America’s
7
policies regarding homosexuality.
While expression such as this is, to say the least, difficult to tolerate,
especially by the families of fallen soldiers, First Amendment
jurisprudence nonetheless requires that we permit such speech. Last
8
year’s RAFHA, however, restricts demonstrations on or near
Arlington National Cemetery or any cemetery under the control of
9
the National Cemetery Administration (“NCA”).
This statute

5. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (West 2006).
6. See WashingtonPost.com, Faces of the Fallen, http://projects.washingtonpost.
com/fallen/dates/2006/jun/16/forrest-p-ewens/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (listing
individual deceased soldiers and their age at time of death, hometown, cause of
death, etc.); Goodman, supra note 3 (explaining that the Westboro Baptist Church
has taken its “love crusades” to military funerals nationwide, including that of Lt.
Ewens).
7. See Goodman, supra note 3 (explaining that the Church believes God is
punishing America by killing soldiers because of this country’s tolerance of
homosexuality).
8. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413. The text of the Act reads in part:
(a) Prohibition. No person may carry out—
(1) a demonstration on the property of a cemetery under the control of the
National Cemetery Administration or on the property of Arlington National
Cemetery unless the demonstration has been approved by the cemetery
superintendent or the director of the property on which the cemetery is
located; or
(2) with respect to such a cemetery, a demonstration during the period
beginning 60 minutes before and ending 60 minutes after a funeral,
memorial service, or ceremony is held, any part of which demonstration —
(A)(i) takes place within 150 feet of a road, pathway, or other route of
ingress to or egress from such cemetery property; and
(ii) includes, as part of such demonstration, any individual willfully making
or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to
disturb the peace or good order of the funeral, memorial service, or
ceremony; or
(B) is within 300 feet of such cemetery and impedes the access to or egress
from such cemetery.
9. Id. Although 38 C.F.R. § 1.218 (2006) and 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(f) (2006) set
out quite similar rules of behavior explicitly prohibiting disturbing conduct and
distributing pamphlets for all Veterans Affairs facilities, including those under the
NCA’s control, and Arlington National Cemetery respectively, this Comment only
assesses the constitutionality of RAFHA. Moreover, this Comment does not address
The Respect for the Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act, legislation that would go beyond
RAFHA’s current limitations to ban protests at any military funeral, wherever it
occurs. See Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin’s Respect for the Funerals of Fallen
Heroes Act Headed to President to be Signed Into Law (Dec. 11, 2006), available at
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prohibits certain expression within 300 feet of the cemetery and 150
feet of any road, pathway, or other route leading into the cemetery
10
from one hour before until one hour after every funeral. Restricted
conduct includes picketing, orating, and displaying flags when such
11
expression is not part of the funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.
This Comment argues that RAFHA, as currently written, cannot
stand in light of First Amendment jurisprudence. Part I reviews the
history and development of relevant free speech case law and
restrictions on expression, including the recent trend in the states of
passing legislation similar to RAFHA. Part II assesses the Act’s
12
constitutionality against this background. First, Part II contends that
the statute is a content-based restriction of free speech and is thus
subject to strict scrutiny. Second, even if deemed content neutral,
the Act could not survive the courts’ intermediate scrutiny. Finally,
this Comment reasons that even if able to survive the above
challenges, the Act is still unconstitutional under First Amendment
case law because it provides for standardless prior restraint. This
Comment concludes that RAFHA is an unconstitutional regulation of
speech and should be challenged in court.

http://durbin.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=266834&&. This Act was passed by both
houses in early December 2006. Id.
10. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a).
11. Id. § 2413(b)(1)-(3).
12. This Comment only examines the statute’s constitutionality within the
purview of the First Amendment. One might argue that the statute also violates
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute does
not give adequate guidance to those subject to the law and is thus overly vague.
Readers interested in finding more on this issue are directed to Musser v. Utah, 333
U.S. 95, 97 (1948) (“Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it
fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be law–abiding, to advise
defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide
courts in trying those who are accused.”), and Grayned v. City of Rockford,
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that
man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warnings.
Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory applications.
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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I. BACKGROUND: FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS IN THE STATES
RAFHA arrives against the background of a long history of First
13
Amendment cases, as well as recent enactments of similar speech
14
restrictions in quite a few states. The first section of Part I describes
the relevant free speech jurisprudence, focusing on those issues that
would reappear in a constitutional challenge of the Act. The second
section provides a brief study of similar state laws prohibiting speech
near cemeteries and the lawsuits filed challenging those laws.
A. Free Speech Jurisprudence: A Review of Relevant Case Law
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress
15
from making laws abridging the freedom of speech. In considering
speech restrictions, the Supreme Court addresses several
independent but related considerations. To begin, the Court must
16
identify in which forum the regulated speech would take place.
Next, the Court classifies the restriction as either content based or
17
Depending on this determination, the Court
content neutral.
assesses the regulation’s constitutionality under either strict or
18
intermediate scrutiny.
The Court also considers whether the
19
restriction grants unbridled discretion to a state official.

13. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) (discussing contentbased speech restrictions); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
772 (1988) (holding that laws providing for standardless prior restraint by
government officials violate the First Amendment); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (identifying three types of forum relevant
to speech restrictions under the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (asserting that certain speech, such as fighting words, is
unprotected by the First Amendment).
14. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes
similar to RAFHA).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See Robert D. Nauman, The Captive Audience Doctrine and Floating Buffer Zones:
An Analysis of Hill v. Colorado, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 769, 774 (2002) (explaining that
the Court identifies the forum, another consideration in the Court’s analysis, before
deciding which standard of scrutiny to use); Alan Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer:
Restricting Freedom of Expression Outside Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 280 (1999)
(explaining that in cases of “relatively peaceful picketing, courts first pay attention to
the location protesters choose to deliver their message rather than the message
itself”).
17. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 770-76 (describing the Court’s traditional
approach to restrictions of First Amendment rights, including first determining the
forum, then the standard of scrutiny based on whether the law is content based or
content neutral).
18. See id. at 774-76 (explaining that, in public fora, content-based laws are
subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral laws receive intermediate scrutiny).
19. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59
(1988) (finding that because a content-based law that required newspapers to
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1. Determining the forum
Forum is a classification assigned to a certain location for purposes
20
of assessing constitutional obligations under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court recognizes the existence of three types of fora:
the traditional public forum, designated public forum, and
21
nonpublic forum. The Court characterizes the traditional public
forum as one that has been immemorially reserved for public use,
22
including citizens’ assembly, communication, and discussion. This
includes places such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, which may never
23
be closed by the government to all public discourse. A designated
public forum, on the other hand, is one that has not traditionally
served these purposes, but instead has been opened by the
24
government to the public for assembly and expression. Examples of
25
the designated public forum include school board meetings and
26
municipal theaters. The government may silence public speech and
expression in a designated public forum, but not in a traditional
27
public forum.
In these two types of public fora, content-based

continually reapply for a periodic license would logically result in self-censorship, it
was facially unconstitutional).
20. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 774 (explaining that the level of expression
allowed in a particular forum, and thus the amount of leeway given to the
government, depends on the nature of the forum) (citations omitted).
21. See id. at 774-75 (discussing the forum analysis in Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
22. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (explaining
that a traditional public forum has “immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”);
Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (defining a traditional public forum as “a forum
devoted to assembly and debate by tradition” and supporting his statement with the
above quotation from Hague).
23. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (noting that this characteristic truly
distinguishes a traditional public forum from the other two types of fora) (citing
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515).
24. See infra notes 134-135 and accompanying text (explaining that if the
government elects to allow public access to the property, it takes on the same
qualities as a traditional public forum).
25. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisc. Employment Relations
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-77 (1976) (holding that school board meetings are
designated public fora, in part because these are public meetings and decreeing the
meetings to be nonpublic would essentially eliminate communication between
teachers and their government).
26. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (finding
that a municipal theater was a public forum because it was “designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities”).
27. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (finding that the principal difference
between a designated public forum and traditional public forum is that the
government may limit speech and expression in the former, but not in the latter).
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restrictions would be subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral
28
restrictions need only meet intermediate scrutiny.
In a nonpublic forum, on the other hand, speech restrictions are
subject to mere rational basis review and must not intend to silence
29
30
only one opinion. This is because nonpublic fora, such as prisons,
31
32
military bases, and school mail systems, are closed to public
33
communication.
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has never addressed
34
the issue of forum as it applies to municipal cemeteries, several
lower courts have attempted to do so and all classified cemeteries as
35
36
nonpublic fora. In Warner v. City of Boca Raton, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida found that “it seems quite
obvious that cemeteries are nonpublic fora” since, above all, they are
a place for citizens to bury and respect the dead, not to promote
37
38
public debate. In Griffin v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit relied on Warner, assuming for
purposes of that case that Veterans Affairs cemeteries are nonpublic

28. See id. (explaining that in nonpublic fora, content-based restrictions face a
low standard of scrutiny since the government has considerable leeway in restricting
speech, but in public fora, content-based restrictions face strict scrutiny, while
content-neutral restrictions face intermediate scrutiny) (citations omitted).
29. See id. at 775-76 (describing a nonpublic forum as one that is not required to
allow free public communication and explaining that in order to survive there, a
speech restriction must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest,
though it cannot be content based) (citations omitted).
30. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 44-48 (1966) (holding that a sheriff
lawfully arrested members of a student assembly at a county jail because the property
was closed to the public and the crowd’s removal served a security purpose).
31. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (holding that military bases
are nonpublic fora because their essential function of providing common defense for
the nation depends on the commanding officer’s power to exclude civilians).
32. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(holding that a school mail system is a nonpublic forum because it is not open to the
general public, but intended for intraschool communication, despite unaffiliated
organizations’ sporadic use of the system).
33. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775-76 (explaining that, even though the
government controls nonpublic fora, it is not obligated to allow free speech there)
(citation omitted).
34. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(admitting that the court was unaware of any precedential case identifying a
municipal cemetery’s forum).
35. See Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(assuming that cemeteries owned by the Department of Veterans Affairs are
nonpublic fora for purposes of the court’s First Amendment analysis because of the
parties’ stipulation); Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (identifying a public cemetery as
a nonpublic forum).
36. 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272.
37. Id. at 1291.
38. 288 F.3d 1309.
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40

fora.
Finally, in Koehl v. Resor, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia did not classify the cemetery but held that
“[a] national cemetery is a public place so clearly committed to other
41
purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous.”
Whereas the district courts used strong, unsupported language such
42
as “clearly” and “obvious” to support their classification, the court of
appeals seemed to hesitate, resting its assumption on the fact that
neither party disputed the classification or presented evidence to the
43
contrary. As addressed in these cases, the issue of forum is hardly
resolved with regard to municipal cemeteries.
2. Determining whether the restriction is a content-based or content-neutral
time, place, and manner restriction
Depending on a statute’s language, courts apply either strict or
44
intermediate scrutiny. Where a regulation explicitly distinguishes
between favored and disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed,
45
courts nearly always find the regulation content based. Sometimes,
however, statutes are not overtly biased, but discriminate among
46
messages under a veil of seemingly neutral language. Therefore,
courts also look to legislative history and ask whether the restriction
47
applies equally to all protesters regardless of viewpoint.
In
39. See id. at 1322 (finding that where no party challenged the forum
classification, the court could accept the stipulated classification).
40. 296 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Va. 1969).
41. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
42. Supra notes 37, 41 and accompanying text.
43. See Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1322 (explaining that both the parties and other courts
agreed that public cemeteries are nonpublic fora).
44. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)
If the State’s regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent
standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of
noncommunicative conduct controls . . . . If it is, then we are outside of
O’Brien’s test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson’s
conviction under a more demanding standard.
(citations omitted).
See also Nauman, supra note 16, at 772-73 (identifying the different standards of
review for each type of speech). The Court has admitted that determining the
content neutrality of a speech restriction can sometimes be difficult. See Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Deciding whether a particular
regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”).
45. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 643 (adding that, in contrast, a law that
burdens or benefits speech without regard to the expressed ideas is almost always
content neutral).
46. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981) (distinguishing the first-come, first-served restriction in controversy from
covertly content-based restrictions on the grounds that this restriction left no
opportunity for suppressing a particular viewpoint).
47. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000) (relying on legislative history
to support the conclusion that the regulation there was not adopted “because of
disagreement with the message it conveys” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
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determining whether a regulation is content based or content
neutral, then, the Court’s inquiry is driven by the governmental
48
purpose in creating the regulation.
The Court asks “whether the government has adopted a regulation
49
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”
Even if a regulation affects only certain speakers, the Court will
nonetheless deem it content neutral where it serves a purpose
50
unrelated to the content of the expression. In Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, the Supreme Court found that controlling noise levels at
music events to avoid excessively disturbing other park and
residential areas was “justified without reference to the content of the
51
52
regulated speech.” However, in Boos v. Barry, the Court deemed a
regulation prohibiting the display of signs critical of foreign
governments near their embassies a content-based restriction on
political speech because it forbade only one type of speech, while
53
54
permitting all others. Relying on Boos in Texas v. Johnson, the Court
likewise found a regulation banning flag desecration to be content
based, as it restricted political expression because of the content of
55
the protester’s message. There, the law criminalized burning a flag
in protest, but did not regulate burning a flag to respectfully dispose
56
of it according to tradition.
Once the Court has determined whether or not the regulation is
content based, it continues its analysis by applying the appropriate
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (explaining that a
content-based purpose is sometimes sufficient to demonstrate that the regulation is
content based, but is not always required); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 325 (1988)
(supporting the Court’s finding that a regulation was content neutral with legislative
history that illustrated the legislature’s concern with the restriction’s effect on free
speech). But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar
principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive . . . . Inquiries
into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.”).
48. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (“The government’s purpose is the
controlling consideration.”).
49. Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295
(1984)); see Nauman, supra note 16, at 773 (identifying this question as “the principal
inquiry as to whether a regulation is content based”).
50. Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)).
51. Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
52. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
53. See id. at 318-19 (noting that the regulation permitted “[o]ther categories of
speech . . . such as favorable speech about a foreign government or speech
concerning a labor dispute with a foreign government”).
54. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
55. See id. at 411-12 (explaining that because the restriction on expression was
content based, it must be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis).
56. See id. at 411 (suggesting that, had the defendant burned the flag in order to
dispose of it because it was soiled or ripped, he never would have been prosecuted).
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standard of scrutiny. In public fora, content-based restrictions are
assessed using strict scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions
57
receive the Court’s intermediate scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny,
a regulation of speech must be a necessary means for serving a
58
compelling state interest.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the
regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
59
government interest while leaving open ample alternative channels
60
of expression.
a. Content-based restrictions
Where the government has regulated speech simply because it
disagrees with the speaker’s message, the Supreme Court finds that
61
restriction to be content based. The Court presumes that contentbased regulations are invalid because the government cannot simply
grant some, but deny others, the use of a public forum based on
whose views it finds acceptable and whose expression it deems
62
controversial.
Nevertheless, the Court has found some forms of
expression, such as “fighting words” and obscenity, to be unprotected
63
under the First Amendment. This is because the Court considers
that such expression has no social value, or merely communicates an
64
intent to commit a violent and unlawful act.
For example, the
government may regulate fighting words to avoid a breach of the
peace where such expression is: (1) directed at an individual or small
57. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775-76 (describing the three types of fora and
explaining that in the first two, both within the public realm, the Court applies strict
scrutiny to content-based regulations and intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral
ones, whereas in a nonpublic forum, the Court applies a single, rational basis
standard).
58. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (articulating this strict standard).
59. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-800 (1989) (finding that
the city’s concern over preventing excessive noise was effectively achieved through a
regulation requiring a city sound technician).
60. Id. at 791.
61. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s
inquiry into the government’s purpose when analyzing free speech restrictions).
62. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.”) (citations omitted); Police Dep’t of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (explaining that because “[t]he essence of . . .
forbidden censorship is content control” government may not grant or deny the use
of a forum based on the content of speech).
63. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (establishing a threepronged test for determining whether material is “obscene” and therefore
unprotected under the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-74 (1942) (holding that fighting words, which incite a breach of the peace,
have hardly any social value and thus are unprotected under the First Amendment).
64. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (discussing the different
types of expressive conduct proscribable under the First Amendment, including
fighting words and true threats).
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group; (2) inherently likely to invoke a violent response; and (3) “no
65
Likewise, certain
essential part of any exposition of ideas.”
regulations allowing harsher sentencing for hate crimes do not
violate the First Amendment because they primarily serve to regulate
66
conduct, not speech. Statutes regulating unprotected speech are
therefore permitted to be content based.
67
In applying the most “exacting scrutiny” to content-based
regulations of protected speech, the Court asks whether the
government has proven that the restriction is a necessary means for
68
achieving a compelling state interest. The Court has found that
having an undisrupted school session conducive to students’
69
70
learning and maintaining public safety qualify as compelling state
interests. Nonetheless, it is quite rare that a state interest is deemed
sufficiently compelling to justify a content-based regulation of
71
speech.
Finally, the Court considers whether the regulation is sufficiently
72
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest.
Often, courts look to another factor—whether less restrictive
alternatives exist—to determine whether a regulation is narrowly
65. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 574 (defining fighting words as those “epithets
likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace”); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (finding that vulgar language
on a jacket did not constitute fighting words because the words were not directed at a
particular individual nor displayed to intentionally provoke a violent reaction).
66. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484-88 (1993) (holding that a statute
providing for enhanced punishment for race-based hate crimes was constitutional
since it was a regulation of physical conduct, namely assault, which is neither
expressive nor protected under the First Amendment); cf. Black, 538 U.S. at 363
(holding that a law prohibiting cross-burning was constitutional because such
conduct was a form of intimidation meant to threaten violence and thus unprotected
under the First Amendment). But cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding an ordinance
outlawing certain symbolic actions, including cross-burning, viewpoint specific and
thus unconstitutional because it only punished such conduct when based on the
disfavored subjects of “race, color, creed, religion or gender”).
67. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
68. See id. (citing a string of cases for the proposition that the state must show
that the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))); Nauman, supra note 16, at 773 (“The
government then must prove that the means are necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest in order for the restriction to survive.”).
69. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding an antinoise ordinance prohibiting disruptive protests and picketing near school grounds).
70. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (upholding a law prohibiting offensive or
annoying language in public since such “fighting words” would lead to a breach of
the peace, something the government has a compelling interest in preventing).
71. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the strict scrutiny standard is often fatal).
72. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (addressing whether the law in question serves a
compelling governmental interest after having decided that the law applied in a
public forum, was content based, and was thus subject to strict scrutiny review).
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73

tailored. In Boos, the Court assumed that there was a sufficiently
compelling interest in restricting political speech on streets
surrounding embassies and consulates, yet still found the regulation
facially invalid because it was not narrowly tailored to serve that
74
interest. The Boos Court looked to a similar, less restrictive District
of Columbia law to demonstrate that such alternatives exist, thus
75
invalidating the federal statute.
b. Content-neutral restrictions
Despite the strict protections afforded speech in public fora, one’s
right to free speech is not totally without limitation. The Court has
repeatedly held that, even in a public forum, the government may
restrict expression in time, place, or manner, so long as the
restrictions are unrelated to the content of the expression and pass
76
intermediate scrutiny.
First, the Court inquires whether the restrictions are narrowly
77
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The Court has
held that the government has a substantial interest in protecting its
78
citizens from unwelcome noise in their homes and physical or
79
To be considered
emotional harm when seeking medical care.
narrowly tailored, the regulation must “promote[] a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
80
regulation.”
In Rock Against Racism, the Court found that the
government interest in controlling noise levels was directly and

73. See id. at 324-27 (comparing the District of Columbia law with an analogous,
less restrictive federal law and holding that the federal law’s existence and legislative
history supported a finding that the governmental interest in the District of
Columbia law was insufficiently compelling).
74. See id. (holding that because Congress enacted a less restrictive federal
speech regulation, but then imposed a more restrictive regulation in Washington,
D.C., the restriction was not narrowly tailored).
75. See id. at 325-27 (comparing the federal statute with the District of Columbia
law).
76. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (explaining the
requirements of such time, place, and manner regulations, as well as the
considerations of intermediate scrutiny).
77. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (listing the factors of an intermediate
scrutiny analysis).
78. See id. at 796 (explaining that such an interest is valid because it closely
relates to maintaining parks as in Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296,
and protecting tranquility and privacy at home as in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
484 (1988)).
79. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-18 (2000) (finding that by offering this
protection, the state maintains unobstructed access to health clinics).
80. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
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effectively served by the requirement that the city’s own sound
81
technician handle the volume controls.
Likewise, in certain picketing cases, the Court has deemed “buffer
82
zones” narrowly tailored where the distance was reasonable.
A
buffer zone can be either fixed or floating. In Schenck v. Pro-Choice
83
Network of Western New York, the Court deemed reasonable a fixed
buffer zone prohibiting demonstrations within fifteen feet of
84
85
abortion clinic entrances. In Hill v. Colorado, the Court found that
a floating buffer zone, requiring picketers within one hundred feet of
an abortion clinic to keep a minimum eight-foot distance from
patients entering the clinic, was narrowly tailored to serve the state
86
interest in protecting privacy and access to medical facilities.
Finally, the Court asks whether the restrictions leave open ample
87
alternative channels of expression. This does not, however, mean
that the alternatives must be the least restrictive or least intrusive
88
89
means of restricting speech. In Frisby v. Schultz, the Court found
that an ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of someone’s home
nonetheless left ample alternative channels for communication, such
as going door-to-door, marching through the neighborhoods, and
90
contacting residents by phone or mail.
3. Standardless prior restraint
A prior restraint is not unconstitutional per se, but where no
standards regulate such discretion, there is a heavy presumption of
91
unconstitutionality. The Court has repeatedly invalidated licensing
statutes entrusting government officials with standardless discretion
81. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 801 (finding that without the requirement
the city would have received many complaints, thus disserving the government’s
interest).
82. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 726-27, 729 (comparing the eight-foot buffer zone in that
case to the fifteen-foot zone in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York,
519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997), and finding that the regulation was “an exceedingly
modest restriction on the speakers’ ability to approach”).
83. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
84. Id. at 380-81; see also Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV.
581, 600-01 (2006) (explaining that although the Court invalidated the floating
buffer zone for being overly broad, it upheld the fixed buffer zone).
85. 530 U.S. 703.
86. See id. at 719-20 (upholding the restriction because, in addition to being
narrowly tailored, it also was content neutral and regulated action, not speech).
87. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
88. Hill, 530 U.S. at 726 (citation omitted).
89. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
90. See id. at 484 (agreeing with appellants that such alternatives were sufficient).
91. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (explaining that
in order to prove the constitutionality of a prior restraint, the government bears the
burden of showing that certain safeguards are present).
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over whether to permit or deny expressive conduct out of fear that
92
such discretion may result in censorship. In City of Lakewood v. Plain
93
Dealer Publishing Co., the Court provided several reasons for
prohibiting such unbridled discretion. First, because citizens are
unsure whether the official will grant them the right to disperse their
message, permitting standardless discretion encourages self94
censorship.
If exercise of discretion is standardized, the Court
95
suggests, the added certainty would eliminate self-censorship.
Second, without standards, it is difficult to distinguish between
96
legitimate reasons for denial and biased applications of the law.
Finally, challenging an illegitimate denial is difficult and timely and
97
thus likely would discourage challenges to the licensor’s discretion.
To prevent such abuses, the Supreme Court has invalidated
standardless prior restraint, but has approached content-based and
98
content-neutral regulations differently.
For content-based
regulations of speech, the Court applies a three-pronged test to the
prior restraint provision: (1) the restraint can only be imposed for a
specified brief period so as to preserve the status quo; (2) the law
must guarantee prompt and final judicial determination; and (3) the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the
99
expression is unprotected must fall on the official. Content-neutral
regulations containing prior restraint provisions, on the other hand,
must only contain sufficient standards to guide the official’s decision
100
and provide for judicial review.
92. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-57 (1988)
(explaining that the Court has consistently granted standing to anyone subject to a
law where prior restraint is permitted, even if they have not attempted to obtain a
license).
93. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
94. See id. at 757-58 (asserting that standards prevent self-censorship by limiting
discretion).
95. See id. at 757 (elaborating that “unfettered discretion, coupled with the power
of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the
discretion and power are never actually abused”).
96. See id. at 758 (finding that without standards, licensors can create post hoc
rationalizations to justify their decision for denying a license).
97. See id. at 758-59 (explaining that difficulties of proof and case-by-case
examinations required in such lawsuits leave the speaker’s message unheard and
make the licensor’s action impossible to review).
98. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321-23 (2002) (holding that
content-based regulations, but not content-neutral regulations, are required to meet
procedural safeguards).
99. See id. at 321 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52, 57 (1965))
(listing the three safeguards developed in Freedman, a case involving a prior restraint
on film licensing); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975)
(reaffirming the Freedman safeguards).
100. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (explaining that time, place, and manner
regulations are held to a lower standard).

CORNWELL.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

6/2/2007 3:53:50 PM

A FINAL SALUTE TO LOST SOLDIERS

1343

While the Supreme Court has never addressed this issue in the
context of cemetery rules, two lower courts have. Although both
courts treated the municipal cemeteries as nonpublic fora, each
adopted a different approach in analyzing the issue of prior
101
102
restraint. In Warner v. City of Boca Raton, the Southern District of
Florida found unconstitutional a regulation permitting the cemetery
103
manager to make standardless exceptions to any cemetery rule. On
104
the other hand, in Griffin v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Federal
Circuit held that undefined discretion vested in the superintendent
of Arlington National Cemetery was constitutional for two reasons.
First, the court reasoned that the presumption of unconstitutionality
is weaker in nonpublic fora and, since municipal cemeteries are
nonpublic fora, the regulations sufficiently rebutted the lower
105
standard.
Second, the court asserted that, in light of the nature
and function of the cemetery, vesting standardless discretion in the
106
facility head was reasonable.
B. Legislation and Litigation: The Recent Trend in States
Some states have long had laws regulating activity at funerals to
ensure a respectful burial for the deceased and a peaceful place to
107
mourn for the deceased’s friends and family.
As the Westboro
Baptist Church began picketing military funerals with signs praising
the deaths of fallen soldiers, however, states responded with more
stringent regulations. By the end of May 2006, at least thirteen states

101. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text (reviewing lower courts’
decisions and reasoning for finding cemeteries to be nonpublic fora).
102. 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
103. See id. at 1292-93 (holding that a regulation prohibiting vertical grave
decorations except upon approval from the cemetery manager was standardless and
provided opportunity for discrimination between speech, thus violating the First
Amendment).
104. 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
105. See id. at 1322-23 (asserting that, by its terms, the prior restraint doctrine does
not apply to nonpublic fora).
106. See id. at 1324 (finding that national cemeteries were established by the
Department of Veterans Affairs to serve as “national shrines . . . to our gallant dead”
and for the government’s own expressive purposes).
107. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 594.35(d) (2006) (prohibiting
“[d]isturb[ing], obstruct[ing], detain[ing] or interfer[ing] with any person carrying
or accompanying human remains to a cemetery or funeral establishment, or engaged
in a funeral service, or an interment”); CAL. SENATE COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, 2000 BILL
SUMMARY: MEASURES SIGNED AND VETOED, S. 1999-2000, 1059-S, at 120 (2000),
available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/sen/committee/standing/publicsafety/bills/
billsummary2000.pdf (explaining that section 594.35 would replace a health and
safety regulation prohibiting certain acts of destruction and vandalism to
cemeteries).
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had passed laws similar to the more restrictive RAFHA, while many
109
In fact, RAFHA encouraged
others were considering such laws.
110
states to pass similarly strict laws, and since President Bush signed
111
the bill into law in May 2006, several states have done just that.
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has initiated
112
The
lawsuits challenging the Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky laws.
ACLU brought all three lawsuits on similar bases, so examining only
the Kentucky law and corresponding lawsuit provides an adequate
113
look at the challenges’ foundations.
The Kentucky law creates a

108. See Associated Press, Blagojevich Signs Funeral Protest Bill, CBS2CHICAGO.COM,
May 17, 2006, http://cbs2chicago.com/local/local_story_137154351.html (reporting
that Illinois enacted a law similar to RAFHA in mid-May 2006); Ronald K.L. Collins &
David L. Hudson, Jr., A Funeral for Free Speech?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at 66
(noting that as of April 2006, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin had passed such laws); Ashley
Rowland, Protesters to picket soldier’s funeral, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Sept. 23,
2006 (comparing the Tennessee law passed in spring 2006 with the challenged
Kentucky law); Press Release, Minn. State Rep. Philip Krinkie, Legislative Update
from Rep. Phil Krinkie, May 17, 2006, http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/members/
pressreleasels84.asp?district=53A&pressid=1404&party=2 (reporting that Minnesota
Governor Pawlenty signed a bill similar to RAFHA into law in mid-May 2006); Press
Release, SEIU Michigan State Council, Under the Dome Capitol Update, Feb. 10May 24, 2006, http://www.seiumi.org/news/press.cfm?pressReseaseID=1842 (choose
year “2006” then follow “Under the Dome May 25, 2006” hyperlink) (reporting that
this bill was signed into law on May 24, 2006).
109. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (claiming that in April of 2006
at least twenty states were considering such laws).
110. H.R. 5037, 109th Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 2006) (“It is the sense of Congress that
each State should enact legislation to restrict demonstrations near any military
funeral.”).
111. See, e.g., South Carolina Legislature Online, H.4965, Gen. Assem., 116th Sess.
(S.C. 2006), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/cgibin/web_bh10.exe?bill1=49
65&session=116&summary=T (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (reporting that, even after
the governor vetoed the bill, the legislature overwhelmingly succeeded in overriding
the veto in June 2006); Michael Sangiacomo, Legislators go to court to back Rest in Peace
Act, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 12, 2006, at B10 (reporting that the Ohio
governor signed the Rest in Peace Act into law on September 4, 2006). Kansas, the
Westboro Baptist Church’s home state, recently passed a similar law in April 2007.
See Associated Press, Kansas governor signs legislation against anti-gay picketing at soldiers’
funerals, IHT.COM, Apr. 12, 2007,http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/12/
America/NA-GEN-US-Funeral-Picketing.php# (reporting that the law prohibits
protesting within 150 feet of a funeral during, or for one hour before or two hours
after, the ceremony).
Fearful that the WBC would challenge the law’s
constitutionality, however, the legislature stipulated that the law will not take effect
until the state supreme court or a federal court deems the law constitutional. Id.
112. Complaint, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL (W.D. Mo. 2006),
available at http://www.aclu-em.org/downloads/PhelpsCOMPLAINTFINAL.pdf;
Complaint, McQueary v. Stumbo, No. 3:06-CV-00024 (E.D. Ky. 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file568_25439.pdf; Sangiacomo, supra
note 111, at B10 (reporting that the ACLU of Ohio filed suit within several days of
enactment of the law).
113. See Sangiacomo, supra note 111 (reporting that the ACLU is challenging the
law on grounds of overbreadth); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of
Eastern Missouri, Funeral Protest Challenge, http://www.aclu-em.org/pressroom/20
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300-foot radius around any funeral, funeral procession, memorial
service, or ceremony within which congregating, picketing, and
114
Additionally, unless the
demonstrating are completely prohibited.
deceased’s family or the person conducting the service approve, the
statute prohibits activities such as singing, whistling, using sound
amplification equipment, and displaying images within earshot or
115
eyesight of participants in the service.
The ACLU of Kentucky,
representing a Kentucky resident and Westboro Baptist Church
supporter, is challenging that state’s law on several grounds,
including its overbreadth and provision permitting standardless prior
116
restraint. On September 26, 2006, the district court judge issued a
preliminary injunction suspending the law’s enforcement so as to
117
avoid irreparable injury to the plaintiff during the trial. The court
found that the law was content neutral and served a significant
118
governmental interest, but was not narrowly tailored.

06pressreleases/72106acluchallengeslawbann.htm (reporting that the ACLU of
Eastern Missouri had filed suit for Shirley Phelps-Roper, the Westboro Baptist
Church’s spokeswoman, against the Missouri Governor and Attorney General, as well
as the county’s prosecuting attorney on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness and
asserting that the law is content based and does not serve a valid government
interest); Kentucky: A.C.L.U. Backs Pickets at Funerals, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A16
(reporting that the ACLU filed suit to challenge the law in part for its overbreadth).
114. See H.B. 333 § 5(1)(b), 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006).
115. See H.B. 333 § 5(1)(c), 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006).
116. Complaint, McQueary v. Stumbo, No. 3:06-CV-00024 (E.D. Ky. 2006),
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file568_25439.pdf. First, the
plaintiff alleged that the law is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and a
content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest. Id. at 4. Second, he claimed that the statute contains
“overbroad criminalizations of speech” because the radius is too large and the law
criminalizes more speech than needed to avoid disruption to the funeral service. Id.
at 1, 5 (noting that simply entering onto land or congregating within three hundred
feet of a funeral would hardly disrupt the service, yet such activity would be punished
under the law). Third, the plaintiff claimed that it is impermissible for a private
party to have the authority to permit certain speech and expression, while denying
others, on public property. Id. at 5. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the law is
overbroad “in that it forbids singing, chanting, or displaying images on public
property, even if not disruptive, simply because it occurs within earshot or eyesight of
funeral participants.” Id.; see H.B. 333 § 5(1)(c)(1). At the time this Comment was
completed, none of the three courts had reached a final result.
117. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 997-98 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order
granting preliminary injunction) (finding that while the injunction would serve the
public interest and not cause substantial injury to others, it would cause irreparable
injury to the plaintiff).
118. See id. at 992, 997 (holding that the law is unconstitutionally overbroad
because, although it was content neutral and served the state’s legitimate interest in
prohibiting interference with funerals, it restricted more speech than necessary).
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II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESPECT FOR AMERICA’S
FALLEN HEROES ACT
RAFHA is unconstitutional under the First Amendment for several
reasons. First, it is viewpoint specific and discriminates between
speech based on content. As noted above, content-based regulation
119
of speech is presumptively invalid and would not pass strict scrutiny.
Second, even if deemed content neutral and thus assessed under
intermediate scrutiny, the Act could not stand constitutional muster
because it is not narrowly tailored, does not serve a government
interest and does not leave ample alternative means for expression.
Finally, even if the statute survives intermediate scrutiny, it
120
nevertheless provides for standardless prior restraint, which is
constitutionally
impermissible
under
First
Amendment
121
jurisprudence.
A. The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act Restricts Speech Occurring in
Both Designated and Traditional Public Fora
The Supreme Court’s first step in analyzing any speech-restricting
statute is to determine which of the three fora the regulation
122
addresses.
Here, the statute regulates speech both on cemetery
123
124
property and any roads, paths, and routes of ingress and egress.
More importantly, though, the statute also reaches any place located
125
within a 300-foot radius of the cemetery or a 150-foot radius of any
roadways or paths leading to the cemetery, including public roads
126
and sidewalks. While forum jurisprudence in lower courts indicates
that cemeteries are nonpublic fora, the Supreme Court has yet to

119. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that, because under the
First Amendment the government cannot distinguish between favored and
disfavored speech, speech regulations based on the content of expression are
presumptively invalid).
120. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1) (West 2006) (“[U]nless the demonstration has
been approved by the cemetery superintendent or the director of the property on
which the cemetery is located . . . .”).
121. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (explaining that there exists a
heavy presumption of unconstitutionality for statutes providing for standardless prior
restraint and outlining the different tests for determining whether the presumption
is supported).
122. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 774 (noting that, because the standard of
scrutiny to be applied depends on the type of forum, forum must be considered
first).
123. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1) (West 2006).
124. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(B).
125. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i).
126. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(B).
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127

address the question.
The Court likely would find that the
cemetery property is a designated public forum, while the other areas
fall within the first Perry category, the traditional public forum, since
they have customarily been places of public discussion and
128
expression.
Since both areas are within the public forum, speech
regulations applied there will be subject to the same level of
129
scrutiny.
First, the cemetery property, including the roads and paths
130
thereon, should be deemed a designated public forum. As defined
in Perry, a designated public forum is property that the state owns and
131
has opened for expressive activity by the public.
Cemeteries, long
used in the United States and throughout the world for people to
132
gather and express their sentiments, fit within this definition.
127. See supra notes 34, 36-41 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning of
two courts, one district and one circuit, in holding that municipal cemeteries are
nonpublic fora).
128. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (finding that public streets and
sidewalks are traditional public fora because they have been used immemorially for
assembly of and communication among citizens).
129. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (concluding that the same constitutional
protections apply in a designated public forum opened by the government for public
expression as in a traditional public forum); see also supra note 28 and accompanying
text (explaining that in public fora, content-based restrictions are subject to strict
scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
130. There is even an argument, albeit a weak one, that cemetery property could
be deemed a traditional public forum. For more on this, see Edward J. Neveril,
“Objective” Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of
Architectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1185, 1238-39 (1996) (examining Justice
Kennedy’s suggestion in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) to define objective
physical characteristics demonstrative of a traditional public forum). Justice
Kennedy based his approach on “whether the property shares physical similarities
with more traditional public forums.” Id. at 1239 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 698-99). Neveril’s comment argues that
[T]he Arlington National Cemetery would appear to have many of the same
physical qualities as the typical public park. It is wide-open, largely covered
with greenery, and transected by a maze of sidewalks. Objective use is similar
as well . . . . Under Justice Kennedy’s objective approach, a court would be
hard-pressed to classify the Cemetery as anything other than a public forum.
In addition to the physical similarities, it is difficult to see how expressive
activity in general would be incompatible with the normal uses of the
Cemetery—especially if, as a factual matter, it had been opened to expressive
activity by veterans’ groups.
Id. at 1240.
131. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678 (elaborating on the forum
categories defined in Perry).
BRITANNICA
ONLINE,
PYRAMID
(2006),
132. See,
e.g.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://www.search.eb.com.proxy.wcl.american.edu:2048/eb/article-9062034
(last
visited Mar. 11, 2007) (describing the use of pyramids throughout the world, but
most notably in Egypt and Central and South America, as royal tombs, especially
between 2686 and 2345 B.C.); ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, SPAIN (2006),
http://www.search.eb.com.proxy.wcl.american.edu:2048/eb/article-70345
(last
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Specifically, those cemeteries held by the National Cemetery
Administration (“NCA”) and Arlington National Cemetery have
conferred this right on visitors since the 1860s, when the federal
133
government commissioned their development.
Admittedly, the Court has held that, although the government has
opened its property to the public for such use, it is not required to do
134
so indefinitely.
Yet, so long as the property remains open to the
135
public, it takes on the same qualities as a traditional public forum.
Here, the federal government continues to keep all cemeteries
subject to the Act open to the public. With an average of twenty-eight
136
funerals per day, Arlington National Cemetery welcomes around
137
four million visitors every year. Furthermore, the cemetery’s Visitor
Center offers maps and guidebooks, displays exhibits, provides
information services including grave locations, and contains a
bookstore, all designed to entice people to visit and accommodate
138
them upon arrival.
While this is not typical of all federal
cemeteries, the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 123 National

visited Mar. 11, 2007) (discussing the prominence of tombs, funerary monuments
and cemeteries in Spain between 4500 and 3200 B.C.). See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA ONLINE, CEMETERY (2006), http://www.search.eb.com.proxy.wcl.america
n.edu:2048/eb/article-9022046 (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (reviewing a general
history of cemeteries world-wide and the impact of different religious, geographic,
and cultural factors on their development).
133. See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, COMMC’NS AND OUTREACH SUPPORT DIV., The
National Cemetery Administration, available at http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/pdf/nca.
pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2007) (highlighting that, in 1862, Congress enacted
legislation authorizing the president to establish national cemeteries for fallen
soldiers, who created the first fourteen that year); Arlington National Cemetery
Visitor Information, Arlington National Cemetery Facts, http://www.arlington
cemetery.org/visitor_information/anc_facts.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007)
(explaining that in 1864, the Secretary of War designated Arlington Mansion and two
hundred acres around it for the burial grounds of veterans).
134. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (noting that a state may close its facility to
the public).
135. See id. (explaining that so long as a state retains an open facility, contentbased restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral time,
place, and manner regulations are permitted); see also Police Dep’t of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (noting that “[o]nce a forum is opened up to
assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say”).
136. See Arlington National Cemetery Facts, supra note 133 (estimating that the
cemetery conducts about 6400 funerals per year, with interments and inurnments
averaging about twenty-eight per day).
137. See Arlington National Cemetery, Visitor Information, http://www.arlington
cemetery.org/visitor_information/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (explaining
that the four million visitors each year include tourists as well as those attending
funerals or paying respect to gravesites).
138. Id.
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Cemeteries nevertheless received over 8.8 million visitors and
139
interred more than 93,000 people in one recent year.
Arlington National Cemetery and the cemeteries of the NCA can
hardly be deemed nonpublic fora. The Court has previously found
locations such as jails, military bases, and school mail systems to be
nonpublic fora because communication is not open to the public in
140
these places, even though they are owned by the State. Specifically,
141
in Adderley v. Florida, the Court distinguished a state capitol building
from a county jail, finding that while the former’s grounds are open
142
to the public, the latter’s grounds are not.
Cemeteries, on the
other hand, more closely resemble capitol grounds, where all citizens
143
are permitted so long as they act peacefully.
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that, just as any
property owner may maintain his or her property’s purpose, the
government may likewise preserve the “lawfully dedicated” use of its
144
property.
For example, in Adderley, the Court reasoned that
jailhouses close their grounds to serve the purpose of the facility’s
145
existence—to provide security. A cemetery’s purpose is admittedly
146
to bury the dead and provide a place for others to remember them.
However, the NCA and Arlington National cemeteries also serve as
tourist attractions and welcoming centers for millions of visitors each
147
year.
Additionally, the Arlington National Cemetery

139. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, COMMC’NS AND OUTREACH SUPPORT DIV., Facts
About the National Cemetery Administration, available at http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/
pdf/facts.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (reporting that 8.8 million people visited the
123 national cemeteries in fiscal year 2005).
140. See supra notes 30-32 (explaining the reasoning behind the Court’s holding
that these different places are nonpublic fora).
141. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
142. See id. at 42-43 (distinguishing that case from Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963)).
143. See Adderley, 385 U.S. at 42-43.
144. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(assessing a school mail system’s purpose); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976)
(assessing a military base’s purpose); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47 (assessing a county jail’s
purpose).
145. See Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47 (explaining that state capitol grounds are
traditionally open to the public so long as the visitors are peaceful, whereas jailhouse
grounds have no such tradition).
146. Memorandum from Dr. Tony Walter, Lecturer and Reader, University of
Reading, to the Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs,
House
of
Commons,
United
Kingdom
Parliament
(Dec.
2000),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmenvtra/91/91m
48.htm.
147. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text (explaining that until the
government closes a designated public forum, it is treated as a traditional public
forum, and the number of visitors to the cemeteries here demonstrates that the
government has not yet closed this forum).
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Superintendent notably testified that demonstrations are part of the
148
cemetery’s history, dating at least as far back as the Vietnam War.
The lower courts that categorized cemeteries as nonpublic fora
failed to address the above issues, and instead brushed over the
forum analysis, claiming that cemeteries are “clearly” and “obviously”
149
nonpublic. Yet, as demonstrated above, a more in-depth discussion
of forum jurisprudence reveals that municipal cemeteries fall largely
within the definition of a designated public forum. As such, contentbased restrictions on speech in cemeteries would be subject to strict
scrutiny while content-neutral restrictions would be subject to
150
intermediate scrutiny.
Second, the areas outside of the cemetery property, including
roads and sidewalks, should be deemed traditional public fora. A
traditional public forum is an area that has “immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
151
citizens, and discussing public questions.” Public streets, sidewalks,
152
Within
and parks are the quintessence of traditional public fora.
300 feet of the cemetery property and within 150 feet of any road or
path leading to the cemetery property, there are countless public
streets and sidewalks. Depending on how one defines “road,
pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from such cemetery
property,” the area subject to the statute likely encompasses parks as
153
well.
Under established forum jurisprudence, then, the Court
148. See generally The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act: Hearing on H.R. 23, H.R.
601, H.R. 2188, H.R. 2963, H.R. 5037, and H.R. 5038 Before the Subcomm. on Disability
Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2006) [hereinafter Hearings], at 98 (statement of John Charles Metzler, Jr.,
Superintendent, Arlington National Cemetery).
149. Supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
150. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (noting that content-based restrictions in
both traditional and/or designated public fora face strict scrutiny analysis, while
content-neutral restrictions face intermediate scrutiny).
151. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
152. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (finding that public streets and
sidewalks are traditional public fora because they have been immemorially used for
citizens to assemble, communicate, and engage in public debate).
153. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2006); 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(B).
With a number of public roads leading onto cemetery property, it is difficult to say
where a court would draw the line. For example, a major roadway has an exit
providing direct ingress to and egress from Arlington National Cemetery property
and that roadway continues for miles in either direction. In applying the statute, one
wonders where the 150-foot radius surrounding the road ends. Does the bubble
continue until the roadway’s end? This ambiguity would probably be examined in a
vagueness analysis under a procedural due process challenge. See supra note 12
(explaining the analysis in a facial challenge of a statute for vagueness). However,
this Comment touches on this issue in its discussion of whether the Act is narrowly
tailored. See infra notes 272, 274 and accompanying text (comparing this statute with
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undoubtedly would deem the areas around the cemetery traditional
public fora. The statute as applied to both areas is therefore subject
to the same level of scrutiny since both the cemetery property, a
designated public forum, and the surrounding areas, traditional
154
public fora, are within the “public” realm.
B. Assessing the Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act’s Content Neutrality
After addressing the question of forum, the Court next asks
whether the regulation is based on the content of the speaker’s
155
message. Part II.B.1 maintains that the Act here should be deemed
content based and subject to strict scrutiny because its enactment was
biased, its language is viewpoint specific, and its enforcement is
discriminatory. Part II.B.2 argues that if nevertheless found to be a
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction on speech, the Act
still could not survive intermediate scrutiny since it is not narrowly
tailored.
1. The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act is a content-based regulation of
constitutionally protected speech and cannot survive strict scrutiny
RAFHA is content based because its text distinguishes between
speech based on viewpoint, it was enacted for biased reasons, and it is
156
While the government may regulate certain
unfairly enforced.
categories of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment
those of other cases and arguing that, as in those cases, RAFHA restricts more speech
than necessary and is therefore not narrowly tailored).
154. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 775 (explaining that in both types of public
fora, traditional and designated, intermediate scrutiny is applied to content-neutral
restrictions and strict scrutiny is applied to content-based restrictions).
155. See id. at 770-76 (noting that the Court’s traditional approach to restrictions
of First Amendment rights considers the forum first, then determines which standard
of scrutiny to apply based on whether the law is content based or content neutral).
156. But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985-86 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (concluding that a Kentucky law quite
similar to RAFHA was content neutral, although it was motivated by both contentbased and content-neutral factors). In McQueary, the court found the law content
neutral after it considered the legislature’s intent, government interests, and the
law’s text, but did not consider the law’s enforcement. See id. at 983-86 (finding the
law content based to the extent that it was aimed at (a) prohibiting Westboro Baptist
Church members specifically from protesting and (b) avoiding violent interaction
between mourners and protesters, but ultimately concluding that the law was content
neutral because of its other predominate purposes: (a) to prevent all interference
with funerals, regardless of its source or content, and (b) to protect citizens from
unwanted communications). While looking at the legislature’s motivation as well as
the law’s text are important factors in determining content neutrality, consideration
of the regulation’s enforcement is equally important. See infra notes 159-160 and
accompanying text (maintaining that where these three factors are biased, courts will
find the speech restriction content based). Since the district court ignored this
factor, its finding that the Kentucky law was content neutral should have no impact
on the analysis here.
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based on content, RAFHA regulates protected speech.
Therefore,
because content-based regulations of protected speech are subject to
strict scrutiny, the Court should test the Act under the strict scrutiny
standard. The Act, however, cannot meet this exacting standard
because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest and could not even survive an analysis under
158
the less-demanding intermediate scrutiny standard.
First, to determine whether the Act is content based, one must
consider certain factors, including the restriction’s text, enactment,
159
and enforcement.
If the Court finds these factors to be biased, it
160
likely will deem the regulation viewpoint-specific. Generally, where
a law’s language expressly distinguishes between speech based on the
views or ideas expressed, the Court finds that law to be content
161
based. For example, in Hill, the Court found that a law restricting
speech in front of medical clinics was not content based in part
because its text made no reference to the content of the speech, but
162
rather applied equally to all demonstrators.
RAFHA, on the other hand, does not apply equally to all
demonstrators. Instead, the text of the Act explicitly favors one
category of speech over another, namely speech that is “part of a
163
funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.”
As such, RAFHA would
not by its terms prohibit the Patriot Guard Riders from making noise,
orating, or displaying banners or flags because their “demonstration”
164
is considered part of the service.
The Riders are a group of

157. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (describing different types of
unprotected speech).
158. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text (summarizing the strict and
intermediate scrutiny standards and the difficulties in proving the higher standard’s
requirements); infra Part II.B.2 (arguing that the Act does not meet the intermediate
scrutiny standard because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant state
interest and does not leave open ample alternative channels of communication).
159. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (analyzing an ordinance’s content neutrality by looking at its
text, enactment, and enforcement).
160. Cf. id. (finding that the ordinance in that case was viewpoint neutral since its
text, enactment, and enforcement did not favor one category of speech over
another).
161. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (“As a general
rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on
the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.”).
162. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (determining that the law was
content neutral because it was a regulation of place, not speech; it was not adopted
because of disagreement with the speaker’s message and applied equally to all
demonstrators; and the governmental interest was unrelated to the content of the
speech).
163. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(b)(2)-(3) (West 2006).
164. See Patriot Guard Riders, Mission Statement, http://patriotguard.org/
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motorcyclists whose mission is to “[s]hield the mourning family and
their friends from interruptions created by any protestor or group of
165
protestors.” This group formed in response to the Westboro Baptist
Church’s (“WBC”) actions and now demonstrates against WBC’s
presence by escorting funeral guests to the funeral site or memorial
166
service.
The Riders’ presence at military funerals is as politically
167
driven and demonstrative as that of their counterparts. The Riders
arrive on loud motorcycles decorated with American flags, wear
Patriot Guard Rider paraphernalia, and hold flags during the service
168
to block picketers from the view of funeral guests.
Nevertheless, the motorcyclists would be permitted under the Act
to demonstrate in their way, waving flags and wearing Patriot Guard
Rider patches, since their expression is patriotic and thus considered
169
“part of the funeral.” WBC picketers, on the other hand, would not
be permitted to wave their signs or wear upside-down American flags
in protest because this conduct would be deemed disrespectful and,
therefore, not part of the funeral. The Patriot Guard Riders are
merely counter-protesting in response to WBC’s demonstrations and
170
should be subject to this law if it is to be content neutral. Instead,
the law’s text distinguishes between these two types of speech based
on the ideas and views expressed, which is clearly content based
171
under Hill.
Home/tabid/53/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (noting that they attend
funerals as guests of the deceased soldier’s family).
165. Id.
166. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Evan Bayh, Bayh Joins Bipartisan Coalition
Honoring Patriot Guard Riders (July 18, 2006), http://bayh.senate.gov/~bayh/relea
ses/2006/0718JULY06PR.htm (explaining that the group started in Kansas in
response to the Westboro Baptist Church protests and describing the Riders’
technique for countering the Church’s protests).
167. See Patriot Guard Riders, Our History, http://patriotguard.org/AboutUs/
OurHistory/tabid/145/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (stating that the
group formed in August 2005 because it was “appalled to hear that a fallen hero’s
memory was being tarnished by misguided religious zealots,” and that it immediately
began “form[ing] a battle plan to combat Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist
Church”).
168. See Patriot Guard Riders, PGR FAQ, http://patriotguard.org/PGRFAQ/tabid
/250/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2007) (stipulating that, while there is no
official dress code, members are encouraged to purchase and wear Patriot Guard
Riders patches); Press Release, U.S. Senator Evan Bayh, supra note 166 (describing a
funeral where Riders stood with their backs to protesters and used American flags to
block funeral-goers from seeing them).
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (stating that, as guests of the
family, the Riders are permitted to demonstrate under the statute).
170. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (explaining that laws that
discriminate between viewpoints, whether discretely through application or explicitly
in the statutory language, are most often content based).
171. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining the Hill Court’s
reasoning for finding the law in controversy not to be content based).
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Of course, the Court has held that even if a statute affects only
certain speakers, it may nonetheless be deemed content neutral if it
172
To
serves a purpose unrelated to the content of the expression.
make this determination, a content-neutrality analysis scrutinizes the
statute’s enactment, asking whether the government passed the
regulation because it disagreed with the message of the restricted
173
expression.
Here, hearing testimony and floor statements from
members of Congress demonstrate that Congress enacted RAFHA
174
because it strongly disagreed with the WBC’s message. In fact, one
U.S. Representative went so far as to admit that “while we may
disagree with the message, we don’t disagree that they have a right to
175
deliver it. It is just not appropriate.”
While the Act’s sponsors tried to use language that the Supreme
176
Court already approved as constitutional, they nonetheless made
clear that their objective was to silence those who protest the funerals
177
of “military heroes.”
The Act’s language prohibiting
172. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that
incidental effects on some messages or speakers but not others do not render a
regulation content based so long as the governmental purpose is unrelated to the
expression’s content) (citations omitted).
173. See id. (finding that a government regulation is content neutral where, by
looking at the government’s purpose, it is justified without reference to the regulated
speech’s content); Nauman, supra note 16, at 796 (explaining the Rock Against Racism
test, in which the primary inquiry in determining the restriction’s content neutrality
is whether the government’s principal motivation for adopting a law is based on a
disagreement with the message conveyed). But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383-84 (1968) (stating the “familiar principle of constitutional law that [the
Supreme] Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis
of an alleged illicit legislative motive” because “[w]hat motivates one legislator to
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it”).
174. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 148, at 46-47 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot,
Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution) (stating that he was promoting RAFHA
before the Committee because of the recent trend of military funeral protests, which
he finds incompatible with the respect owed to service members); 152 CONG. REC.
H2204 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Silvestre Reyes) (stating that he
disagreed with the message and that, although he believed they had a right to
express it, doing so at military funerals was inappropriate); infra note 181 and
accompanying text (quoting two congressmen’s understandings of RAFHA’s
purpose).
175. 152 CONG. REC. H2204 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Silvestre
Reyes).
176. See Hearings, supra note 148, at 44 (2006) (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers,
Member, Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (claiming that the Act uses, “word for
word,” language already approved by the Court so as to “eliminate any doubt
concerning the [c]onstitutionality of H.R. 5037”); 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed.
May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot) (explaining that the Act’s
demonstration provision mirrors the language of the restriction upheld in Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
177. See 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve
Chabot) (describing the picketers’ tactics and saying that they “should not be
consistent with our Nation’s laws”); 152 CONG. REC. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006)
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demonstrations, which includes making any “noise or diversion that
178
disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the funeral,”
mirrors that of an anti-noise ordinance upheld in Grayned v. City of
179
Rockford. The members of Congress supporting the Act argue that
it is justified without reference to the regulated speech’s content
because it was intended to keep the peace and respect the privacy of
180
mourning family and friends.
However, the sponsoring Congress
members’ speeches regarding this statute make clear that its
purpose—to prevent protesters who “feel a military funeral is an
appropriate forum to display their beliefs on gay rights”—is one
181
directly related to the content of the expression.
Since the
government enacted RAFHA because it disagreed with the message of
the restricted expression, the Court should deem RAFHA content
based.
The Act’s enforcement is also biased. As described above, it has
not been and is not likely to be enforced against the Patriot Guard
182
Riders.
In fact, it is also quite unlikely that it will be enforced
against tourists or other cemetery visitors who display American flags
on their cars or clothing. Nevertheless, those visitors are probably in
violation of the law if they have an American flag pin attached to
their lapel on cemetery property or within a 300-foot radius of the
cemetery property line during the applicable times. Such biased
enforcement is yet another factor demonstrating that this law is not
content neutral, but rather viewpoint specific.
(statement of Sen. Larry Craig) (explaining that the Act was “conceived in response
to hateful, intolerant demonstrations taking place at the funeral services of deceased
servicemembers”).
178. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2006).
179. Cf. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107-08 (upholding an ordinance that read: “[N]o
person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a
school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of
any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of
such school session or class thereof . . . . ”).
180. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200-01 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Silvestre Reyes) (explaining that the protests disrupt the sanctity of the funerals and
the privacy of the families in mourning). These governmental interests, which have
little merit, are examined below. See infra notes 221-252 and accompanying text
(assessing RAFHA’s governmental interests in the sanctity of cemeteries and the
families’ privacy and dignity, and concluding that these interests fail to satisfy
intermediate scrutiny).
181. 152 CONG. REC. E774 (Extensions of Remarks May 10, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Dennis Moore); see also 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Steve Buyer) (noting that after he recounted some of the WBC’s
tactics, “most all [of] my colleagues shared a deep abhorrence to these outrageous
acts and . . . share[d] equally a deep desire to prevent them”).
182. See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (discussing the Patriot Guard
Riders’ tactics in counter-demonstrating against the WBC, including wearing Rider
insignia).
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When the Supreme Court finds that a statute is indeed content
based, it then determines whether the Act regulates protected or
183
Political
unprotected expression under the First Amendment.
speech, as restricted here, is among the quintessential forms of
184
protected speech.
With regard to printed or symbolic expression,
the Supreme Court has held that peaceful picketing and leafletting
constitute protected “speech” for purposes of a First Amendment
185
analysis.
Nevertheless, where the speech’s content is extremely
provocative and plays “no essential part of any exposition of ideas,” it
is possible that it no longer falls under the First Amendment’s
186
protection.
Here, the Act’s supporters harp on the family’s vulnerable state,
the dignity of fallen soldiers, and the WBC protesters’ offensive
187
language in defending the restrictions.
However, the Court has
held that neither the “sensitive person standard” nor the “dignity
standard” is the appropriate gauge for determining what speech must
188
be censored.
Instead, the Court relies on “community standards,”
whereby the Court judges a message based on its impact on an
189
average person, not a particularly susceptible or sensitive one.
In
183. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (describing different types and
the alternative analysis of “expression” unprotected under the First Amendment).
184. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (recognizing that the Court has
long held that the First Amendment protects debate on public issues (citing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
145 (1983); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))).
185. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (“There is no doubt that as a
general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving
‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted).
186. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also id. at 574
(defining fighting words as those “epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace”).
187. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve
Buyer) (claiming that the Constitution should not be manipulated to justify the
harassment of grieving families by protesters with offensive signs); 152 CONG. REC.
H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) (stating that protesters
are harassing mourning families with hurtful signs and speech, which causes undue
stress for the families and lessens the pride and dignity in burying fallen soldiers).
188. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574-75 (2002) (“[T]his Court held that
this sensitive person standard was ‘unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of
speech and press’ and approved a standard requiring that material be judged from
the perspective of ‘the average person, applying contemporary community
standards.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))); Boos, 485
U.S. at 322 (rejecting the assertion that “protecting the dignity of foreign diplomatic
personnel” by shielding them from insults qualifies as a compelling governmental
interest because such a dignity standard is too subjective and would punish speech
with an emotional impact on the audience, contrary to free speech jurisprudence);
see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974) (emphasizing that the
principal purpose of the community standards criterion “is to assure that the
material is judged neither on the basis of each juror’s personal opinion, nor by its
effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group”).
189. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted).
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fact, even where the United States was bound by international treaty
to prevent impairment to the dignity of foreign diplomats, the Court
rejected the “dignity standard” and held that, under the First
Amendment, people must tolerate both insulting and outrageous
190
speech in public debate.
Therefore, any argument that insulting
expression should be curbed because funeral-goers are in an
emotionally vulnerable state is legally invalid, despite being morally
proper.
Alternatively, the Act’s supporters might argue that the WBC’s
speech is unprotected because it is offensive or constitutes fighting
191
words.
Yet, the protesters’ speech falls within neither of these
definitions. To begin, a restriction may curtail offensive speech only
when the expression is so intrusive that an unwilling audience is
192
captive and cannot avoid it. An audience is captive when it cannot
193
help but listen to or see a certain message. Persons in their home
194
exemplify a captive audience, but the Court has also recognized an
unwilling listener’s “right” to avoid unwanted communication in
195
confrontational public settings. Although the Supreme Court held
in earlier cases that it is up to the listener to avoid unwanted speech
196
197
outside of the home, it later moved away from this approach. For

190. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (explaining that First Amendment speech rights
need breathing space in order to survive and refusing to punish speech that
adversely impacts listeners (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56
(1988))).
191. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (suggesting that supporters
might rely on the offensive speech and fighting words doctrines to defend speech
restrictions, but ultimately finding that they would not be applicable to recent
funeral protests).
192. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (finding that the First
Amendment permits prohibition of offensive speech where the audience is captive by
deeming such speech “intrusive”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)
(explaining that, in the context of the unwilling listener, the First Amendment does
not require captive audiences to “undertake Herculean efforts” to avoid unwanted
communication (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73
(1994))).
193. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 776-80 (defining a captive audience according
to earlier cases, but suggesting that Hill may have expanded the doctrine’s scope).
194. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717 (acknowledging that while “the right to avoid
unwelcome speech” is particularly strong in and around one’s home, it can also be
protected in public confrontational settings (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t,
397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970), and Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485)).
195. See id. at 717 n.24 (explaining that “[t]his common-law ‘right’ is more
accurately characterized as an ‘interest’ that States can choose to protect in certain
situations” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967))).
196. See Nauman, supra note 16, at 777 (explaining that Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971), stood for this principle, which makes it quite difficult for an audience
to be deemed “captive” in public places); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive
Audience, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 96 (1991) (claiming that Supreme Court
decisions like Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15, and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
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instance, in abortion clinic cases, the Court has analogized patients in
clinics to residents in private homes, finding that certain speech was
not permitted outside of the clinic because targeted picketing of a
198
clinic, like that of a home, threatened the patients’ well-being.
Patients approaching the clinic but not yet inside, however, were not
considered captive and, as a general matter, had to tolerate picketers’
199
peaceful speech on the sidewalks.
Here, picketing a cemetery is like picketing a clinic in that the
targeted audience is probably in a vulnerable emotional state and
must use the sidewalks to reach their final destination. There are,
nevertheless, several important differences between the two. First,
medical circumstances held clinic patients captive since they could
200
not leave the facility or their health might be endangered.
Cemetery visitors, on the other hand, are not bound to the cemetery
property by any condition, such as treatment at a clinic, but choose to
201
attend the services at a public location.
That brings up a second
point: the memorial services are indeed held in a public location.
202
Granted, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a plurality decision, the
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting political
advertisements in city buses, which are undoubtedly public, because
the captive audience would be forced to withstand political

205 (1975), emphasize that the responsibility of avoiding offensive speech falls on
the listener).
197. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974)
(holding that city transit system patrons were captive even though they could turn
away from offensive speech).
198. See William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado’s Chilling Effect on
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 406 (2001) (citing Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)) (explaining that the Madsen Court found the
state’s interests in protecting a captive audience, ensuring public safety, and
preventing traffic problems sufficient to justify the injunction).
199. See Lee supra note 198, at 406-08 (discussing Madsen, which upheld a
restriction on noise levels but struck down the restriction on “images observable”
based on the difference in effort that patients must make to avoid unwanted
communication).
200. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357, 372 (1997)
(listing the reasons, including protecting the medical privacy of “captive” patients,
for finding constitutional the injunction in Madsen, which prohibited displaying
images or making noise that could be seen or heard in the clinic as well as
approaching any person within a 300-foot radius of the clinic unless the person
acquiesced).
201. But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order
granting preliminary injunction) (assuming that funeral attendees, like clinic
patients, are captive because they have no choice in the funeral service’s location and
must go to the designated place if they wish to take part in the event).
202. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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203

propaganda.
The bus riders were deemed captive because they
204
were taking public transit “as a matter of necessity, not of choice.”
Here, the families could choose to hold memorial services in their
homes or in private funeral homes, and to bury their loved ones in
205
private cemeteries.
Moreover, a majority of the Court held in Lehman that the degree
of captivity largely depends on location, with a bus passenger
suffering a significantly higher degree of captivity than a person on
206
the street.
Mourners attending services in cemeteries pass
demonstrators on the street, and are thus captive to a lesser degree, if
207
at all.
For these reasons, the funeral-goers are hardly a captive
audience and, because speech is offensive only when it intrudes upon
208
an unwilling, captive audience, the speech here cannot be found
offensive.
Additionally, the fighting words doctrine is not applicable to the
expression here because the protests lack the close proximity of
physical contact, the direct provocation of violence, and an imminent
209
The doctrine removes from
and significant breach of the peace.
the First Amendment’s protection those words “likely to provoke the
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
210
peace.”
Here, while the WBC’s speech may offend the great
203. See id. at 303 (finding that the city has discretion in making reasonable
decisions on who may advertise in what the Court termed “part of the [transit
system’s] commercial venture”).
204. Id. at 302 (citation omitted).
205. See infra notes 251-252 and accompanying text (discussing these options with
regard to preserving the family’s privacy interests).
206. See Christopher Dengler, Cell Phones and the First Amendment in Flight:
Can the FCC and FAA Maintain the Ban? 35-36 (Mar. 8, 2006) (unpublished J.D.
student symposium article, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review), available at
http://llr.lls.edu/symposium/Dengler%20-%20final.doc (explaining that both the
plurality and concurring opinions agreed that the degree of captivity and intrusion
of privacy varied according to location of the audience).
207. See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order
granting preliminary injunction) (holding that funeral attendees, despite finding
them to be captive, could easily avoid observing unwanted written expression by
averting their eyes upon passing protesters).
208. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
209. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (finding that even if all three
of these elements were present, the Act would be pointless since laws forbidding a
breach of the peace are already in place and would handle such situations). It is
relevant to note that the fighting words doctrine has hardly, if ever, been used to
uphold a conviction since its introduction in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (identifying the fighting
words doctrine as “rarely used”); FreedomForum.org, What is the Fighting Words
Doctrine?, http://www.freedomforum.org/packages/first/fightingwords/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (summarizing the doctrine’s usage and concluding that the
Court has not used it to uphold a conviction since its creation).
210. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
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majority of passersby, perhaps even causing others to become
aggressive, this alone cannot be deemed an incitement to breach the
peace. That is, even if the protesters need police protection due to
the crowd’s disagreement with their views, “constitutional rights may
not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or
211
exercise.”
As explained in Part I, the speech must also be directed at an
individual or small group of people and play no essential part of any
212
exposition of ideas.
While one may argue that the WBC’s
213
distasteful slogans target individuals attending the funerals, one can
hardly deem the expression to play no essential part of debate.
Political dissent is one of the most valued types of expression in
214
America and has been since before this country’s inception. WBC’s
demonstrations are designed to express disagreement with United
215
States policies and constitute the quintessence of political speech.
As such, the speech does not fall under the fighting words doctrine.
Finally, assuming that the Court finds the Act to be a content-based
regulation of protected speech, the Court would apply its strict
216
scrutiny standard.
Often, the Court’s application of strict scrutiny
217
Here, the Act
to regulations is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”
cannot meet this standard’s high requirements, as it cannot even
218
satisfy the lower intermediate scrutiny standard.

211. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (quoting Watson v. City of
Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).
212. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
213. See Anti-gay group protests at National Cemetery, supra note 1 (stating that the
picketers held a sign proclaiming “You’re going to Hell”).
214. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957) (discussing the
importance of the freedom of speech, particularly the freedom of minority political
expression, in the foundation of America’s democracy).
215. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (stating that WBC members
protest because they disagree with the nation’s tolerance of homosexuality).
216. For a content-based statute to survive strict scrutiny, it must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored, and use the least restrictive
means for achieving the state interest. See supra note 68 and accompanying text
(articulating the requirements for a statute to survive strict scrutiny analysis).
217. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the strict scrutiny standard is often fatal); Eugene Volokh, ParentChild Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 665 (2006)
(finding that the strict scrutiny standard in the context of free speech is “‘strict’ in
theory and fatal in fact”) (citation omitted). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” (citing
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995))).
218. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (describing the high
requirements of strict scrutiny review and the difficulties in meeting the exacting
standard).
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2. The Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, if found to be a contentneutral time, place, and manner restriction, cannot survive intermediate
scrutiny
As explained above, a statute survives intermediate scrutiny where
it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and
219
leaves open ample channels for communication of the message.
Here, the Act would not survive because the government interest is
220
not significant, the law is not narrowly tailored, and the restrictions
do not leave open ample channels of expression.
The government intends RAFHA to serve two stated interests.
First, it is designed to protect the character and sanctity of the
military cemeteries, as demonstrated by its provision forbidding

219. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
220. While an argument may be made that RAFHA is overbroad, the Court likely
would reject this argument by relying on Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). Laws
that are overbroad not only fail the narrowly tailored test, but are facially
unconstitutional because they deter constitutionally protected activity. See Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003) (explaining that the Court developed the First
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth out of concern that an overbroad law,
especially one imposing criminal punishment, would discourage citizens from
engaging in constitutionally protected speech because they feared litigation and/or
punishment); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 463 n.11 (1987)
(concluding that, although obstruction of police duties “might constitutionally be
punished under a properly tailored statute,” the statute criminalized constitutionally
protected speech and was thus overbroad and invalid); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972) (finding that an overbroad law deters constitutionally
protected activity and therefore poses a significant threat to First Amendment
rights). The Court has reasoned that, since the “social costs” of enforcing an
overbroad law are significant, the doctrine appropriately mandates total invalidation
of the speech regulation. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119 (reasoning that overbreadth
adjudication decreases “social costs” such as reduced expression and a repressed
marketplace of ideas resulting from the withholding of protected speech). For a law
to be deemed overbroad, it must have the effect of substantially restricting
constitutionally protected conduct. See id. at 119-20 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)) (finding that an overbroad law’s application to protected
activity must be substantial, both absolutely and relative to the scope of the law’s
legitimate applications, so as to prevent permitting constitutionally unprotected
conduct, which could result from overapplication of the overbreadth doctrine). In
Hill v. Colorado, the Court distinguished between laws that by their terms restrict
protected speech and those that restrict unprotected conduct, yet also encompass
protected speech. 530 U.S. at 730-31 (explaining that the defendants misplaced
their reliance on cases concerning regulations of unprotected activity that also
implicated protected speech because here defendants challenged a regulation of
protected speech). While the overbreadth doctrine applies to the latter, the former
is simply a matter of plain free speech analysis. See id. (finding that the defendants
misunderstood the overbreadth doctrine in attempting to apply it to a statute that
bans protected speech by its terms, instead finding that, as a content-neutral speech
regulation, the proper analysis was whether it was a reasonable time, place, and
manner regulation of protected conduct). Here, the Act does not regulate
unprotected speech as shown in Part II.B.1. Therefore, the Court likely would find
an overbreadth analysis of this law inappropriate.
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221

disturbances of the peace or service.
Second, the supporting
members of Congress sought to protect the privacy of mourning
222
While the first
family and friends of deceased service members.
interest might constitute a significant governmental interest, the
second does not.
The Court has not expressly recognized an interest in preserving
the solemn character of military cemeteries, yet it likely would deem
such an interest to be a significant governmental interest. In Grayned
v. City of Rockford, the Court found that preventing disturbances to
school activities constitutes a valid state interest because noisy
223
demonstrations are incompatible with normal school activities.
Likewise, the Court held in Ward v. Rock Against Racism that the State
had a significant interest in protecting citizens from unwanted
224
noise.
Here, the government could argue that noisy
demonstrations are incompatible with normal cemetery activities and
that its interest in preserving the reverential character of military
cemeteries is therefore valid.
Alternatively, the government might argue that the Act is, in
protecting the nature of the cemeteries, intended to protect against
breaches of the peace.
Although the Court has consistently
recognized an interest in preventing a breach of the peace, this is a
225
226
weak argument here.
In Cox v. Louisiana and Edwards v. South
227
Carolina, the Court invalidated statutes designed to protect against
breaches of the peace because they were overly broad and punished
221. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve
Buyer) (stating that the Act will protect the sanctity of military funerals); 152 CONG.
REC. H2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of David F. Forte, Professor of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance
and Mem’l Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs) (explaining that the text of
the Act, which prohibits diversions causing disturbance of the peace or funeral,
makes clear that its purpose is to guarantee the dignity of military funerals).
222. See 152 CONG. REC. H2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve
Buyer) (stating that the Act will protect grieving families’ privacy); Hearings, supra
note 148, at 44 (statement of Rep. Mike Rogers, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce) (stating that he introduced the legislation to “shelter grieving families
from demonstrators trying to disrupt funeral services”); id. at 52 (statement of Rep.
Silvestre Reyes) (arguing that the “bill is narrowly tailored to protect military families
from . . . verbal attacks”).
223. See 408 U.S. 104, 119 (1972) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance because it
was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest).
224. See 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (finding that this interest may be greatest when
protecting unwanted noise penetrating the home, but in certain cases, it is also
applicable in such traditional public fora as parks and streets).
225. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1989) (recognizing a
government interest in preventing a breach of the peace, but finding that on the
facts in that flag-burning case, the interest could not support the conviction).
226. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
227. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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228

peaceful, albeit loud and disfavored, expression.
The Court has
repeatedly held that “[t]he mere fact that expressive activity causes
hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression
229
unprotected.”
Here, the Court likely would find that the funeral
picketers are not causing a breach of the peace since, although they
sing and chant loudly, they are not using “fighting words,” but merely
230
presenting ideas contrary to that of the majority.
Conversely, the Court probably would reject the suggested interest
in protecting the family’s privacy. The Court has found two relevant
privacy interests adequately significant to pass intermediate
231
scrutiny. First, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court recognized the privacy
interest in avoiding unwanted communication, a part of a citizen’s
232
larger common law “right to be let alone,” on public sidewalks. In
the context of that case, this interest protected those entering a
medical facility from “persistent importunity, following and
233
dogging.”
Hesitant to define this interest too broadly, the Court
234
conceded that the interest’s strength varies with location and it
235
must be balanced with the right of others to communicate. In Hill,

228. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 550-51 (reversing the convictions of protesters who had
picketed, sang, orated, clapped, and stomped their feet in the state capitol building
in part because their action was not inciting violence in any way); Edwards, 372 U.S.
at 237-38 (finding the offense to be too generalized, and thus the conviction invalid,
because all that was needed to prove a violation was that protesters presented views
sufficiently disfavored by the public to necessitate police protection).
229. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
230. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 551 (analogizing to Edwards, 372 U.S. 229, and
distinguishing from Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), where a public speaker
encouraged black listeners to rise up against whites and caused the crowd to become
restless, because the protesters’ actions in Cox were significantly different).
231. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004)
(finding that families of deceased persons can assert a valid privacy interest in police
images of the deceased against the media); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17
(2000) (describing the unwilling listener’s interest in being “let alone” as one of the
most valued rights).
232. 530 U.S. at 716; see Nauman, supra note 16, at 770 (explaining that although
the Court found such an interest existed, it did not clarify when or where it would
apply in future cases). This interest appears to be the primary justification for the
captive audience doctrine, discussed above in Part II.B.1. See Strauss, supra note 196,
at 106-16 (explaining that courts typically use this right or the “right to privacy” to
justify the captive audience doctrine and suggesting that these ambiguous rights
could mean one of three things: the right to choose, the right to repose, or the right
to be free from offensive speech).
233. Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Am. Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921)).
234. See id. at 716 (explaining that such a privacy interest is less important when in
a public park than in one’s private residence) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 21-22 (1971)).
235. See id. at 718 (explaining that even though preserving the freedom to
communicate is a substantial concern, it must nonetheless be weighed against the
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demonstrators sought to educate those entering the clinic and
purposefully followed patients in order to have a discussion with
236
them.
The privacy interest in Hill is nevertheless distinguishable from the
privacy interest advanced in support of RAFHA. Here, the interest is
not as significant as it was in Hill because the protesters are not
“following and dogging,” but picketing in one place on public streets
237
and sidewalks. Under Hill, people may approach others, even in an
offensive manner, with the purpose of educating them or trying to
convince them of another viewpoint until the person declines the
238
239
offer.
At that point, the advocate must cease and desist.
WBC’s
purpose is to persuade American citizens and politicians to change
240
their lifestyles and this country’s public policies.
Yet, even if done
aggressively or offensively, there is no privacy interest as described in
Hill since the picketers are not approaching those attending funerals,
241
but rather demonstrating in one place at cemetery entrances. The
physical proximity in such instances is thus nothing like that in Hill,
where “sidewalk counselors” approached individuals entering the
242
medical facility to speak with them one-on-one.
Without such
physical proximity, the privacy interest as protected in Hill is simply
not relevant here. Lastly, the final consideration from Hill weighs the

right to be let alone) (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736
(1970)).
236. See Lee, supra note 198, at 389-94 (describing tactics used by “sidewalk
counselors,” such as closely approaching patients and trying to establish a rapport
with them, displaying graphic printed materials if patients “[do] not respond to
‘positive’ literature,” and praying for them).
237. See Anti-gay group protests at National Cemetery, supra note 1 (describing the
WBC protesters’ location in a small, closed-off area across a four-lane highway from
the protesters supporting the military families).
238. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18 (finding that accosting a person in an offensive
way to debate an issue does not violate that person’s rights, but once he or she
refuses the discussion, “following and dogging” becomes annoying and borders on
intimidation (quoting Am. Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 204)).
239. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18 (applying the free passage into work rule (from
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204
(1921)) to medical facilities).
240. See Westboro Baptist Church, FAQ, http://www.godhatesamerica.com/ghfmi
r/main/faq.html#Who (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (explaining that the WBC perceives
homosexual tolerance as a threat to America and that they protest in order to
change America’s policies).
241. See Margie J. Phelps, Lifting up an Ensign to the Nation: Showing the Signs to
Bombastic Big Mouth Bastard President Bush, WBC EPICS, May 29, 2006, http://www.god
hatesfags.com/featured/epics/2006/20060529_arlington-va-epic.pdf
(recounting
the WBC protest at Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day 2006).
242. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 708 (describing sidewalk counselors’ tactics, including
conversation and distribution of literature).
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243

right to communicate with the privacy interest.
Here, free speech
wins out since, as described above, the picketers are not targeting
individuals, but are staying in one spot. Because WBC does not
follow or approach particular passersby, it would be quite easy for
visitors to ignore the communication and continue walking.
Therefore, any privacy interest hardly suffers when the right to
communicate is granted.
The second relevant privacy interest comes from National Archives
244
& Records Administration v. Favish. There, the Supreme Court found
that families of deceased persons have a privacy interest against
245
public intrusions.
While such a general interest might appear to
support a privacy interest in RAFHA, a closer look reveals the Court’s
intended meaning of this right. In fact, the right is defined quite
narrowly, protecting only a family’s right to make burial
arrangements for the body and “to limit attempts to exploit pictures
246
of the deceased family member’s remains for public purposes.”
With regard to RAFHA’s scope, this interest is irrelevant. The
Favish Court based its privacy claim on families who wished not to
have crime scene photographs of the deceased’s corpse disclosed to
247
the public. That interest thus hinges on private information being
248
The privacy claim at issue here protects no
publicly revealed.
private information about the deceased or the family. Instead, the
claimed interest seeks to protect the family’s privacy by sheltering it
from content being publicly expressed at a funeral on public
249
property.
This is essentially the “dignity standard” as rejected in
Boos. There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that people must tolerate
insulting and outrageous speech and that an interest in shielding

243. See id. at 718 (“While the freedom to communicate is substantial, ‘the right of
every person “to be let alone” must be placed in the scales with the right of others to
communicate.’” (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738
(1970))).
244. 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
245. See id. at 167 (finding that such a right is supported by common law and
cultural tradition).
246. Id.
247. See id. at 160 (defining the issues as (1) whether a privacy interest in criminal
records and documents extends to the family where the family objects to disclosure
of crime scene photographs and, if so, (2) whether the family interest in privacy
outweighs the public interest in disclosure).
248. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (finding that familial privacy is
irrelevant in funeral protests because no private information is being disclosed).
249. See id. (explaining that familial privacy does not protect against the public
expression of views).
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certain persons from speech with an adverse emotional impact is
250
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Furthermore, families can hardly expect privacy while mourning in
a public cemetery, especially those cemeteries that welcome up to
251
four million visitors per year. If privacy is of such importance to the
families, they should limit their mourning to private churches,
252
cemeteries, and homes. Given this background, the privacy interest
as submitted here simply is not a significant state interest.
Second, RAFHA is not narrowly tailored. The Court has defined a
narrowly tailored regulation as one that promotes a substantial
government interest that could not be achieved as effectively if the
253
regulation were not in place. Here, the government could equally
achieve its interests by enforcing other rules already in place. Under
Section 1.218 of Title 38, the Code of Federal Regulations already
criminalizes most of the conduct addressed by RAFHA, such as
disturbances, demonstrations, and distribution of handbills on
property under the charge and control of the Department of
254
Veterans Affairs, which includes the NCA.
Likewise, Arlington
National Cemetery is protected under the Code, which sets out the
visitor rules and prohibits certain disruptive conduct on cemetery
255
grounds. With such regulations in place, the government’s interest
in protecting the sanctity of the cemeteries is already served. In fact,
the Superintendent of Arlington National Cemetery has said that the
combination of these two restrictions has “adequately addressed
256
potential demonstrations and disruptive behavior in the past.” The

250. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (holding that a law prohibiting
protests near foreign embassies and consulates was unconstitutional, despite an
international agreement not to offend diplomats). But see McQueary v. Stumbo, 453
F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction)
(relying on the state interest in protecting citizens’ right to participate in events
without interference from others to find that there exists a significant state interest in
preventing interference with funerals) (citation omitted).
251. See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text (reporting the estimated
number of visitors and interments per year at the Arlington National Cemetery and
NCA cemeteries).
252. See Collins & Hudson, Jr., supra note 108, at 66 (asserting that families
seeking to avoid hateful speech so as to mourn in peace have the option of mourning
in private churches, temples, funeral homes, cemeteries, and residences).
253. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (explaining that,
while a regulation satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement where a substantial
government interest would be achieved effectively without it, this standard does not
mean that such a regulation may burden substantially more speech than necessary to
achieve the government’s interest) (citation omitted).
254. 38 C.F.R. § 1.218 (2006).
255. 32 C.F.R. § 553.22 (2006).
256. Hearings, supra note 148, at 98 (statement of John Charles Metzler, Jr.,
Superintendent, Arlington National Cemetery).
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cemetery superintendent is probably the most qualified person to
determine if the rules already in place were sufficient to prevent
257
If the superintendent finds these less
disturbance to visitors.
restrictive means of regulating speech to be sufficient, then the Court
should likewise hold them to be adequate and find RAFHA
unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored.
When seeking support for the Act in Congress, members of
Congress largely relied on Grayned v. City of Rockford to demonstrate
258
that the Act was constitutional. In Grayned, the Court found a city’s
anti-noise ordinance, prohibiting willful making of noise or
diversions near a school that tend to disturb class sessions,
259
constitutional.
The Court noted three reasons for finding that
provision to be narrowly tailored, which do not hold true for
260
RAFHA.
First, the Grayned Court found the provision to be narrowly tailored
because it allowed for peaceful picketing adjacent to school grounds,
261
so long as the demonstration was not noisy. Here, however, the Act
prohibits all picketing, noisy or not, within 150 feet of any road or
262
path leading to the cemetery.
Second, the Court held that the ordinance gave no opportunity for
263
Yet, as
punishing based on the content of one’s expression.
257. See 152 CONG. REC. H2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of David F.
Forte, Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, before the Subcomm. on
Disability Assistance and Mem’l Affairs, H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs) (finding that
a national cemetery superintendent maintains the cemetery and its activities so as to
honor fallen service members); see also Kate Pickert, A Field of Trees and Bones, LOST
MAG., Dec. 2005, http://www.lostmag.com/issue1/treesbones.php (explaining that
the current superintendent grew up on Arlington National Cemetery property and
observed many of the changes and difficulties since the age of four, as his father had
also previously served as Arlington Cemetery superintendent).
258. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Steve Chabot) (stating that RAFHA used almost the same language found to be
constitutional in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
259. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 119 (finding that the law was not overbroad, but
narrowly tailored).
260. See id. at 119-21 (holding that the ordinance was narrowly tailored because it
punished only conduct that disturbed school sessions, gave no license to punish
picketers for the content of their message, and imposed only a modest and
reasonable regulation consistent with both the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
261. See id. at 119-20 (finding that this limitation was narrowly tailored, even
though the ordinance may prohibit some picketing that is neither violent nor
physically obstructive).
262. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2006); cf. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453
F. Supp. 2d 975, 996 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction)
(finding that a Kentucky law essentially identical to RAFHA was not narrowly
tailored, in part, because it prohibited picketing or making any noise within 300 feet
of a funeral whether or not funeral attendees could see or hear demonstrators).
263. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 120 (noting that the ordinance prevented
interference with the school’s function without preventing peaceful picketing or
giving license to punish picketers because of their message).
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explained above in Part II.B.1 and below in Part II.C, RAFHA does
264
punish based on content. Its enforcement is biased and it gives
license to cemetery officials to determine whether individuals may
demonstrate on cemetery grounds, but provides no standards for who
265
may be excused from the Act’s restrictions.
Third, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance imposed only
266
a modest and reasonable regulation. One example the Court cited
in Grayned was that the provision was only effective during school
hours and protesters could therefore demonstrate before and after
267
hours as students and staff entered or left school grounds. RAFHA,
on the other hand, is effective for one hour before and after each
268
Since most guests probably arrive and leave within this
funeral.
time frame, it is quite likely that the majority of guests will not cross
paths with the demonstrators. In fact, this time restriction is
essentially a total restriction. While the NCA cemeteries conduct an
269
average of two services per day, Arlington conducts an average of
270
Arlington only operates for either nine or eleven
twenty-eight.
271
Therefore, there are likely two or three services
hours each day.
each hour of operation. At least with regard to Arlington, then, the
Act prohibits demonstrations at any time when it might be effective in
reaching the intended audience.
Additionally, with a buffer zone of 300 feet surrounding cemetery
property and 150 feet from any road or path leading to the cemetery,
264. See supra notes 162-171, 182 and accompanying text (explaining how the Act
does not apply equally to all demonstrators, but rather disfavors the WBC protestors
in favor of patriotic speech).
265. See infra notes 288-297 and accompanying text (concluding that the Act
permits official discretion that does not meet the acceptable standards for prior
restraint, and that it is therefore facially unconstitutional).
266. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 121 (analogizing the ordinance to similar ordinances
in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) and Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611
(1968), where the Court held that the special nature of a place may warrant
reasonable regulations of protected speech).
267. Id. at 107. Although another provision restricted picketing 150 feet from any
school building for thirty minutes before and after school hours, the Court found
that provision unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was
content based and could not survive strict scrutiny. Id.
268. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(2) (West 2006).
269. See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Facts About the National Cemetery Administration,
supra note 139 (estimating that the 123 NCA cemeteries bury more than 93,000
people per year).
270. See Arlington National Cemetery Visitor Information, Arlington National
Cemetery Facts, supra note 133 (estimating that Arlington conducts about 6,400
funerals per year).
271. Arlington National Cemetery, Visitor Information, Hours, Access and
Parking, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.org/visitor_information/hours-parking.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (stating that the Cemetery is open to the public every day
of the year from 8 a.m. until 7 p.m. in the summer months, and until 5 p.m. the rest
of the year).
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RAFHA is hardly modest or reasonable. In Grayned, the buffer zone
272
for picketing was 150 feet from any building, not just the property.
273
In McQueary v. Stumbo, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky considered a state law almost identical to RAFHA and
recently issued a preliminary injunction, in part because the 300-foot
buffer zone around cemetery property would restrict too much
274
speech. Much like the law in that case, RAFHA’s scope is too broad
and likely burdens more speech than necessary to serve the state
interests. As such, RAFHA cannot be deemed modest or reasonable,
and certainly not narrowly tailored.
Finally, the Court asks whether there exist ample alternative
channels of communication for the speaker to share his or her
275
message. In Frisby v. Schultz, the Supreme Court upheld an
ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of someone’s home because
it left ample alternative channels for communication, including going
door-to-door, marching through the neighborhoods, and contacting
276
residents by phone or mail.
Here, however, these alternatives are
inadequate because it is more difficult to identify the targeted
277
audience’s contact information.
Unlike in Frisby, where protesters targeted specific doctors whose
home addresses were easily obtained, cemetery protesters are
targeting unidentified tourists from all over the country in addition
278
to specific funeral-goers.
WBC believes that those visiting the
cemetery or attending the service support America’s policies because
279
they honor those who have died for the country.
Additionally,
going door-to-door and contacting by phone or mail are ineffective
alternative
channels
when
substituted
for
face-to-face

272. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107 (quoting the anti-picketing ordinance the Court
invalidated because it only permitted picketing by those involved in labor disputes).
273. 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction).
274. See id. at 996 (explaining that a zone that large would restrict private property
owners’ speech, as well as the general public’s communications on issues totally
unrelated to the funeral).
275. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
276. See id. at 483-84 (agreeing with appellants that such alternatives were
sufficient).
277. Cf. Strauss, supra note 196, at 93 (discussing the decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and arguing that listening to a comedian on the radio
is more affordable and easier than, and therefore not comparable to, paying for an
album or a ticket to a live show).
278. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476 (recounting the protesters’ sidewalk demonstrations
outside an abortion-performing doctor’s home on several occasions); Westboro
Baptist Church, About WBC, http://www.godhatesfags.com/main/aboutwbc.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (explaining that the Church seeks to teach biblical
doctrines to “all men” through peaceful picketing).
279. See Rostow, supra note 4 (elaborating on WBC’s policies and beliefs).
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280

communication.
Protesters who send mass mailings or conduct
door-to-door distributions hardly receive the attention that results
from face-to-face interaction since mailings are easily thrown out, but
demonstrations are harder to ignore. Since the WBC has begun its
campaign of demonstrations, it has received ample attention from
281
The WBC could not have
the media as well as cemetery visitors.
achieved such notoriety without interacting with the targeted
audience in this way.
Another suggested alternative channel, the Internet, is likewise an
insufficient alternative for three reasons. First, it isolates public
officials from protesters’ concerns, thus reducing opportunities for
282
public debate.
Second, cyberspace cannot replace the powerful
283
symbolism of actually being at a street protest with others. Speech
on the Internet shares few, if any, of the critical characteristics of
public protests, which have a history of civil protest and are
“cathartic, expressive, evocative, emotive, and meaningful to those
284
285
who participate.” Finally, “the public square lives.” That is, while
the public cannot commandeer the public square, it does depend
upon streets, parks, and squares for visibility by the intended
286
audience, including the media and politicians.
As the Court has
admitted, confrontational and disruptive protests are critical to
287
promoting change.

280. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 780 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(finding that door-to-door distributions, mass mailings, and telephone campaigns are
ineffective alternatives to interacting with women face-to-face outside of clinics); cf.
Zick, supra note 84, at 648 (arguing that the Internet is an inadequate alternative
because protesting in public is a uniquely effective and meaningful way of dispersing
messages).
281. See, e.g., Westboro Baptist Church, Current WBC News, http://www.godhates
fags.com/news/wbcnewsarchive.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (linking to hundreds
of articles about the WBC funeral protests).
282. See Zick, supra note 84, at 647-48 (explaining that because public space is
continually shrinking and being segmented into “non-places” such as malls and
subways where First Amendment rights do not apply, it is more important than ever
that public debate not be forced to the Internet).
283. See id. at 648 (theorizing that being physically present with masses of others is
a critical aspect of public dissent since protests in public streets and squares continue
to occur, despite the accessibility and simplicity of the Internet).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 649.
286. See id. at 649-50 (referencing recent protests against the war in Iraq, national
political conventions, and presidential inauguration).
287. See id. (hypothesizing that the 1960s Civil Rights movement and Vietnam
protests would have been hardly as effective had they been conducted in places
effectively invisible to the public eye).
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C. Even if Able to Survive Both Strict and Intermediate Scrutiny, the Act is
Nonetheless Unconstitutional Because it Provides for Unbridled Discretion
by Government Officials
First Amendment jurisprudence prohibits standardless prior
restraint because it renders protected speech vulnerable to biased
288
The presumption of a prior restraint clause’s
censorship.
289
unconstitutionality is fully supported where certain safeguards are
290
For content-based regulations, a prior restraint provision
lacking.
must provide three stringent safeguards, while provisions in content291
neutral regulations are required to meet two, weaker conditions.
RAFHA cannot stand as it provides for prior restraint and contains
neither set of safeguards.
If the Court initially found that RAFHA constituted a content-based
restriction, its prior restraint provision would have to: (1) permit
restraint for only a specified, brief period; (2) provide for prompt
final, judicial determination; and (3) impose on the censor the
burden of initiating litigation and proving that the expression is

288. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988)
(explaining that “a licensing statute placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a
government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in
censorship”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (finding that an
ordinance requiring a permit from the city manager was facially unconstitutional
because it subjected the freedom of the press to license and censorship).
289. One circuit court opined that the presumption is weaker in nonpublic fora
than in public fora. See Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1322-24
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that no Supreme Court case applies the prior restraint
doctrine to nonpublic fora and that prior restraint is merely a form of speech
regulation, which would be permissible in a nonpublic forum since the government
is already permitted to restrict speech there). For purposes of this Comment, it is
assumed that the cemetery is a public forum and is therefore accorded the full
weight of the presumption. See supra Part I.A. In Griffin, the Federal Circuit
conceded that other circuits had invalidated regulations permitting standardless
discretion in nonpublic fora. See Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1323 (citing Sentinel Commc’ns
Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, the court admitted
several paragraphs later that just because “the government may constitutionally
impose content-based restrictions on speech in nonpublic fora does not insulate a
regulation from an unbridled discretion challenge.” Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1324 (citing
Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. at 764).
290. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (citing
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)) (reaffirming that a system of prior
restraint does not violate the First Amendment only when: (1) the burden of
instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the material is unprotected is on
the censor; (2) the prior restraint is imposed for a specified and limited period of
time, and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo; and (3) there will be a
prompt final judicial determination).
291. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (listing the elements of each
standard); Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior
Restraint, Due Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11
COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 230-32 (2006) (recounting the rise and fall of prior restraint
safeguards and explaining the Court’s limitation of the Freedman test).
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292

unprotected.
The statute’s language provides for none of these
three safeguards. Instead, the Act vests unbridled discretion in the
cemetery superintendent or director without any mention of time
293
restraints or judicial review.
As such, the Court should deem
RAFHA unconstitutional.
If the Court instead found that RAFHA is content neutral, it likely
still would find that it does not provide the minimum criteria
required of a valid prior restraint provision. The first of two required
safeguards in a content-neutral regulation is that it provides sufficient
294
standards to guide an official’s decision. Explicit limits on officials’
295
discretion is one key to preventing censorship. Here, RAFHA vests
unlimited discretion in public officials. The language of the statute
prohibits all demonstrations unless the cemetery superintendent or
director has approved it, but provides no guidelines for which
296
demonstrations may be excepted from the Act’s restrictions.
The
second safeguard required to prevent abuse of official discretion is
297
standards rendering the prior restraint subject to judicial review.
Again, RAFHA contains no such standards and thus fails the Supreme
Court’s established test.
The Act’s sponsors relied heavily on the language in Griffin to
298
convince Congress of its constitutionality. There, the circuit court
292. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321-23 (2002) (finding the
three Freedman procedural safeguards inapplicable in that case, which involved a
permit requirement for various park activities, because the activities did not raise the
same concerns about potential censorship as in Freedman).
293. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1) (West 2006).
294. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322-23 (holding that content-neutral regulations are
not held to the three, strict Freedman safeguards, but must still provide sufficient
standards to guide officials’ decisions and render it subject to judicial review).
295. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769-70 (1988)
(explaining that an assertion by the government that officials only deny permits for
certain legitimate reasons is insufficient where the text of the law lacks explicit
standards).
296. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2413(a)(1).
297. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (finding that prior restraint standards in a
content-neutral regulation must render it subject to judicial review).
298. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H2202 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Steve Chabot) (asserting that the Act is constitutional in light of Griffin v. Sec’y of
Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). One Congressman mistakenly
asserted that the Supreme Court had decided Griffin, while it was actually a circuit
court. See 152 CONG. REC. H2201 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Silvestre
Reyes) (“In Griffin . . ., the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of existing regulations that prohibit demonstrations on property under the control
of the National Cemetery Administration.”). In fact, he claimed the Court held that
“[a]ll visitors are expected to observe proper standards of decorum and decency
while on VA property. Toward this end, any . . . demonstration except as authorized
by the head of the facility . . . is prohibited.” See id. However, the circuit court was
simply quoting this language from the statute under analysis. Griffin, 288 F.3d at
1315 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(14) (2001)).
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upheld the standardless prior restraint provision for two reasons.
First, asserting that the cemetery was a nonpublic forum and that the
presumption of unconstitutionality is weaker in a nonpublic forum
than in a public forum, the court found that the statute adequately
299
rebutted the lower standard. Second, relying on this conclusion as
well as the nonpublic nature and function of cemeteries, the court
300
found the superintendent’s discretion reasonable.
However, the
court mistakenly based this conclusion on the mere fact that a forum
analysis is required in analyzing the constitutionality of speech
301
restrictions.
The court confused the prior restraint doctrine for a
piece of the forum analysis, which identifies the level of scrutiny to be
used.
Prior restraint, however, is indeed a separate, facial
302
challenge.
In fact, the Supreme Court has concluded that such a
facial challenge is allowed “whenever” a government official has
unbridled discretion under a law, but did not distinguish between
303
public and nonpublic fora.
In Warner, the district court held that
the regulation fit perfectly within this definition and, applying the
304
Because
two-part test described above, found it unconstitutional.
Griffin was an erroneous application of the prior restraint doctrine,
the Court should instead follow the analysis in Warner and find the
Act facially unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
No one has yet challenged RAFHA’s constitutionality, although
several local ACLU chapters have tested similar state laws. Should
some group or individual take on RAFHA, the Supreme Court likely
would find the statute unconstitutional.
To begin, the Act is content based. Not only was Congress’s
conception of the Act biased, but its enforcement is unfair, too. Even
though most Americans would probably agree that the speech here is
despicable and insulting, it is nonetheless protected under the First
299. See Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1322-23 (finding that no Supreme Court case has
applied the prior restraint doctrine to a nonpublic forum, and that the forum is an
important factor in analyzing the constitutionality of a speech restriction).
300. See id. at 1324-25 (reasoning that a cemetery’s commemorative and expressive
roles support a finding that standardless prior restraint is reasonable).
301. See id. at 1323 (discussing the standard of analysis for restrictions in
nonpublic fora).
302. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)
(identifying the prior restraint doctrine as a facial challenge under the First
Amendment).
303. Id. (defining the doctrine’s scope) (emphasis added).
304. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1292-93 (1999)
(holding that, under Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., the regulation was subject to the facial
challenge, but could not survive).
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Amendment. As such, RAFHA is subject to strict scrutiny, but cannot
meet that high standard because it is not the least restrictive means
for achieving a compelling and narrowly tailored governmental
interest.
Even if the Court instead finds the Act to be content neutral, it
could not meet the intermediate scrutiny standard.
RAFHA,
although it may further a significant governmental interest, is not
narrowly tailored. There are already statutes in place to serve the
government’s interest in protecting the character of cemeteries, and
the Act here essentially bans demonstrations during most, if not all,
visiting hours at Arlington National Cemetery. Moreover, it does not
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Finally, RAFHA provides for standardless prior restraint. It vests in
one individual the authority to decide who may demonstrate on
cemetery property and who may not. However, without designated
reasons for allowing demonstrations, the cemetery official may pick
and choose arbitrarily, which likely would result in censoring certain
viewpoints.
Our soldiers did not sacrifice their lives in the fight for democracy
just to have the most important of all democratic rights, the freedom
of speech, ignored in their honor. If we seek to honor America’s
fallen heroes, then we must do so by permitting speech—respectful
or otherwise—even when it may be hardest to hear.

